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ABSTRACT
MANAGING ADVERSE SELECTION IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CALIFORNIA AND WASHINGTON ACA EXCHANGES
Evan Saltzman
Aviv Nevo
Adverse selection in health insurance markets may reduce social welfare by leading some
low-risk consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase coverage, relative to the
socially optimal level. I study the social welfare implications of policies that are designed to
mitigate these effects of adverse selection, including (1) an individual mandate for purchas-
ing insurance and (2) risk adjustment. The mandate addresses suboptimal enrollment in the
market that results from adverse selection, while risk adjustment addresses underinsurance.
I show that the welfare impact of the policies is theoretically ambiguous because there is a
tradeoff in addressing the effects of adverse selection. I then assess how the mandate and
risk adjustment affect social welfare in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) insurance exchanges.
Using consumer-level data from the California and Washington exchanges, I estimate de-
mand for insurance and obtain estimates of marginal cost that I relate to premiums to
account for adverse selection. I compute equilibrium premiums under alternative scenarios
and find that the mandate (relative to no mandate) modestly reduces premiums and risk ad-
justment (relative to no risk adjustment) increases premiums for less costly exchange plans.
The mandate decreases consumer surplus by 2.6 percent because it makes underinsurance
more prevalent and the ACA’s price-linked subsidies limit consumer exposure to premium
reductions. Conversely, risk adjustment increases consumer surplus by 3.9 percent because
it addresses underinsurance and the ACA’s price-linked subsidies limit consumer exposure
to premium increases. I conduct simulations using the estimated model and find the im-
pact of the two policies is sensitive to subsidy designs that expose consumers to premium
changes. If ACA price-linked subsidies were converted to fixed subsidies or vouchers as pro-
iv
posed in some legislative alternatives to the ACA, the mandate would increase consumer
surplus by 6.6 percent and risk adjustment would decrease consumer surplus by 4.2 percent.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Governments have increasingly intervened in health insurance markets to address inefficien-
cies resulting from asymmetric information and limited competition. A common model for
government intervention is managed competition, in which insurers compete for consumers
in regulated markets called exchanges and must comply with rules that govern pricing and
design of insurance contracts (Enthoven, 1978). The insurance exchanges established under
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are a prominent example of managed competition.
One of the principal regulatory decisions in the managed competition model is the degree
to which insurers are permitted to price discriminate. This decision involves an economic
tradeoff between reclassification risk and adverse selection (Handel et al., 2015). Reclassi-
fication risk may arise when insurers can price a change in a consumer’s expected risk by
increasing future premiums. Adverse selection could occur if insurers cannot use informa-
tion on consumer risk to price discriminate. Limiting insurer ability to price discriminate
reduces reclassification risk, but exacerbates adverse selection. Adverse selection may cause
low-risk consumers to buy too little insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) or
not insure at all (Akerlof, 1970), reducing social welfare.
A variety of policies exist to mitigate the effects of adverse selection resulting from price
discrimination regulation. These policies may address two potential consequences of ad-
verse selection: (1) underinsurance or the purchase of too little coverage (i.e., the intensive
margin) and (2) underenrollment in the market (i.e., the extensive margin), particularly
among low-risk consumers. An individual mandate is a prominent example of a policy that
addresses suboptimal enrollment in the market. Under the ACA, the individual mandate
requires most consumers to purchase insurance or pay a penalty.1 The mandate penalty in-
centivizes low-risk consumers to purchase insurance, mitigating the effects of selection into
the insurance market on premiums. In contrast to the individual mandate, risk adjustment
1The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 sets the ACA’s individual mandate penalty amount equal to zero
starting in 2019.
1
is a key policy instrument used to address underinsurance due to adverse selection. In the
ACA exchanges, risk adjustment requires that insurers with lower-than-average risk con-
sumers make transfer payments to insurers with higher-than-average risk consumers. The
transfer payments equalize the expected risk borne by each firm, thereby eliminating the
effects of selection between firms on expected risk.2
In this dissertation, I study the social welfare impact of both the individual mandate and
risk adjustment. I find that the welfare impact of both policies is theoretically ambiguous.
The principal reason is that there exists a tradeoff in addressing the intensive and extensive
margin effects of adverse selection. The individual mandate may enhance welfare by in-
creasing enrollment among low-risk consumers, improving the risk pool. However, premium
differentials between plans may increase if low-risk consumers gravitate to cheaper, less
comprehensive plans, leading to reduced enrollment or even unraveling of more expensive,
comprehensive plans. The mandate may also reduce welfare by compelling some consumers
to purchase insurance against their will.
In contrast to the individual mandate, risk adjustment is likely to address underinsurance
by reducing premium differentials between plans. If firm premiums and expected risk are
positively correlated, risk adjustment is likely to compress equilibrium premiums such that
more expensive plans become cheaper and cheaper plans become more expensive. For
example, a cheap “bronze” plan with high cost sharing may attract disproportionately low-
risk and low willingness-to-pay consumers compared to an expensive “platinum” plan with
low cost sharing. Risk adjustment requires the bronze plan to make a transfer payment to
the platinum plan, likely leading to a higher bronze plan premium and lower platinum plan
premium. Some consumers who might have been underinsuring due to adverse selection
may substitute to the platinum plan, enhancing social welfare. However, some of the bronze
2For purposes of the exposition below, I assume that risk adjustment perfectly equalizes risk between
firms. In my empirical work, I control for imperfect risk adjustment. I also assume that insurer ability
to price consumers according to their expected risks is limited. I focus on the primary rationale for risk
adjustment as a policy tool targeting adverse selection. A secondary objective is to protect insurers from
disproportionately high-risk draws of consumers; I exclude this objective from my analysis by assuming risk
pools are large and other policies such as reinsurance are in place.
2
plan’s customers may exit the market rather than pay the higher premium or shift to the
platinum plan, raising the average risk in the market and reducing social welfare.
Consumers may receive subsidies to purchase coverage in insurance exchanges. In the ACA
exchanges, the subsidy amount is linked to the premium of one of the exchange plans,
limiting consumer exposure to premium changes. Recent work has compared the impact of
“price-linked” subsidies that adjust to premium changes with “fixed” subsidies or vouchers
that are set independently of premiums (Jaffe and Shepard, 2017; Tebaldi, 2017). I extend
this literature by studying how fixed subsidy designs that expose consumers to premium
changes affect the social welfare impact of the individual mandate and risk adjustment. The
individual mandate is likely to have a greater benefit in a market with vouchers because
it plays the primary role in protecting consumers from potential premium increases due
to adverse selection. Conversely, risk adjustment may lead to larger losses of low-risk
consumers from the market if vouchers are in place because they are exposed to higher
premiums for less costly plans.
To investigate the welfare impact of these policies in practice, I specify a differentiated
products model of the ACA exchanges. The model consists of two stages: (1) firms set
premiums simultaneously to maximize their expected profit and (2) consumers choose the
plan that maximizes their expected utility. To implement the model, I use consumer-
level administrative data from the California and Washington ACA exchanges to estimate
demand and cost. My data contain about 2.5 million records in California and 335, 000
records in Washington across the 2014 and 2015 plan years, accounting for approximately 15
percent of nationwide enrollment in the ACA exchanges (Department of Health and Human
Services, 2015). Detailed demographic information enables me to precisely calculate (1) the
premium that consumers face for each plan in their choice sets; (2) the consumer-specific
subsidy received for each plan and (3) the consumer-specific penalty imposed for forgoing
coverage. I combine the consumer-level demand data from the exchanges with data on the
uninsured from the American Community Survey (ACS) to form the universe of potential
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exchange consumers. I also obtain firm-level financial data from several sources, including
the ACA medical loss ratio (MLR) reports.
Using these data, I estimate consumer-level demand and firm-level cost. First, I estimate
demand for health insurance using a nested logit discrete choice model. To address the po-
tential endogeneity of the premium, I exploit consumer-level variation in premiums created
by ACA regulations, including subsidy eligibility rules and exemptions from the individual
mandate. Second, I obtain non-parametric estimates of plan marginal costs by inverting the
firm’s first-order conditions for profit maximization. I relate these estimates to premiums
to measure how marginal costs vary with premiums. Adverse selection is present if higher
premiums have a positive and statistically significant effect on marginal costs.
My estimates of demand and cost are consistent with theory. I find that low-income indi-
viduals, young adults, single individuals, and males have more premium-elastic demand. In
the California ACA exchange, I estimate that a $100 annual premium increase would reduce
a plan’s demand by 20 percent, on average. If the premiums of all exchange plans were to
increase by $100 per year, demand for exchange coverage would fall by about 2 percent.
My demand estimates also indicate that the mandate penalty amount has little impact on
consumer choice, but the penalty’s existence motivates some consumers to purchase insur-
ance. I find evidence of a “taste for compliance” with the individual mandate that has
been theorized in the ACA literature (Saltzman et al., 2015; Frean et al., 2017). A taste
for compliance is a consumer preference for being socially responsible and complying with
the law, regardless of the penalty amount. The taste for compliance could also be described
as an aversion to paying a fine or experiencing a loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). My
estimates of cost provide statistically significant evidence of adverse selection. Controlling
for plan generosity, I find that an increase in premiums results in higher marginal cost.
After estimating demand and cost, I simulate the welfare impact of the individual mandate
and risk adjustment in the ACA exchanges. I find that repealing the ACA’s individual man-
date increases bronze, silver, and gold plan premiums, but reduces platinum plan premiums.
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Mandate repeal increases consumer surplus by 2.7 percent because platinum plans become
cheaper and the ACA’s price-linked shield consumers from the higher bronze, silver, and
gold plan premiums. I also find that risk adjustment, relative to no risk adjustment, com-
presses equilibrium premiums such that more expensive gold and platinum plans become
cheaper and cheaper bronze and silver plans become more expensive. Consumer welfare
increases by approximately 3.9 percent because premiums for more expensive plans decline
and the ACA’s price-linked subsidies offset the higher premiums for cheaper plans. For
both policies, total social welfare is about the same because increases in consumer surplus
are largely offset by increases in subsidy spending.
These results suggest that the subsidy design plays a critical role in determining the welfare
impact of the individual mandate and risk adjustment. I simulate the impact of both policies
if fixed subsidies or vouchers that are set independently of premiums were to replace ACA
subsidies, as proposed in ACA alternatives such as the American Health Care Act of 2017.
Under vouchers, I find that repealing the individual mandate decreases consumer surplus
by 6.2 percent. Vouchers do not adjust to offset the higher bronze, silver, and gold plan
premiums, leading to a 22 percent reduction in exchange enrollment. I also find that risk
adjustment reduces per-capita consumer surplus by 4.2 percent under vouchers. Consumers
are exposed to any premium increases resulting from risk adjustment under vouchers and
some low-risk consumers choose to forgo insurance as a result, reducing consumer surplus.
My dissertation makes several contributions to the literature. First, I illustrate the policy
tradeoffs in mitigating the intensive and extensive margin effects of adverse selection. The
empirical framework that I develop accommodates both margins and allows me to fully
investigate the welfare impact of alternative policies targeting adverse selection, including
the individual mandate, risk adjustment, and subsidy design. Second, I demonstrate that
policies targeting adverse selection can have important interaction effects. In particular,
the subsidy design affects the welfare impact of both the individual mandate and risk
adjustment. Third, I formalize the notion of a taste for compliance with the individual
5
mandate in terms of compensating variation and find empirical evidence to support the
hypothesized taste for compliance.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the rele-
vant literature. Chapter 3 provides background on the ACA exchanges. Chapter 4 builds
a model of the ACA exchanges that I take to the data. Chapter 5 describes the data I use
to estimate the model. Chapter 6 details how I estimate the model. Chapter 7 presents
estimates of demand and claims. Chapter 8 simulates the welfare impact of the individ-
ual mandate and Chapter 9 simulates the welfare impact of risk adjustment in the ACA
exchanges. Chapter 10 simulates how a change in the subsidy design affects the welfare
impact of the individual mandate and risk adjustment. Chapter 11 concludes.
6
CHAPTER 2 : Previous Literature
In this chapter, I discuss how my work relates to the previous literature on the individual
mandate, risk adjustment, subsidy design, and consumer sensitivity to health insurance
premiums. I conclude with a description of how my work relates to the broader economics
literature on health insurance.
2.1. Individual Mandate
Previous assessments have generally found that the welfare impact of the individual man-
date is small or negligible. Frean et al. (2017) find that the ACA’s individual mandate
penalty had little impact on consumer decision-making, while Sacks (2017) estimates that
the mandate increased welfare by $45 per capita per year. Hackmann et al. (2015) study
the impact of the individual mandate in the Massachusetts Connector that predated the
ACA and find an annual welfare gain of 4.1 percent per person. These studies model the
penalty amount either as a price change or as a separate variable. I extend this work by
allowing for the possibility of a behavioral response, such as a taste for compliance with the
mandate.
2.2. Risk Adjustment
The literature on risk adjustment is extensive (see Ellis (2008) and Breyer et al. (2012)
for thorough reviews). Considerable research examines how well risk adjustment programs
equalize firm risk (Brown et al., 2014; Newhouse et al., 2015; Geruso et al., 2016). However,
comparatively less work has studied whether equalizing risk using risk adjustment is welfare-
enhancing. Handel et al. (2015) and Layton (2017) study how risk adjustment affects the
distribution of consumers across plans (i.e., the intensive margin). They find that risk
adjustment can yield welfare gains by reducing underinsurance. Mahoney and Weyl (2017)
develop a theoretical framework of risk adjustment to study how risk adjustment affects
the pool of consumers who choose to purchase insurance (i.e., the extensive margin). They
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show that risk adjustment can worsen the risk pool, resulting in higher premiums, reduced
coverage, and lower social welfare. I build on these previous studies by constructing a
framework that considers how risk adjustment affects both the distribution of consumers
across plans and the pool of consumers who choose to purchase insurance.
2.3. Subsidy Design
My analysis also contributes to a recent literature studying the economic tradeoffs between
“price-linked” subsidies that adjust to premium changes and “fixed” subsidies or vouchers
that are set independently of premiums. Jaffe and Shepard (2017) find that price-linked
subsidies can result in higher premiums and lower social welfare relative to vouchers, but
price-linked subsidies have advantages when insurance costs are uncertain. Tebaldi (2017)
finds that replacing the ACA price-linked subsidy with a voucher of the same amount would
reduce average markups by 11 percent. In this dissertation, I extend this work by studying
the interaction of the subsidy design with the individual mandate and risk adjustment.
2.4. Premium Sensitivity
Table 1 summarizes premium elasticity of demand estimates for several prominent studies
examining individual market insurance (i.e., insurance purchased directly from an insurer
by a consumer). Pre-ACA individual market studies largely rely on national survey data
in which the relevant sample is very small, limiting the potential for focused studies or
natural experiments (Auerbach and Ohri, 2006). Accurate measurement of key variables,
such as premiums, plan characteristics, and consumer choice sets, is difficult because a
centralized exchange for purchasing insurance did not exist. More recently, researchers
have been able to address many of these data shortcomings by analyzing data from the
Massachusetts Connector. These studies generally find greater premium sensitivity (Chan
and Gruber, 2010; Jaffe and Shepard, 2017; Finkelstein et al., 2017). It is unclear how
well these estimates generalize to the ACA exchanges because they usually focus on the
Massachusetts Commonwealth Care program, which served consumers with incomes below
8
300 of the poverty level and assigned enrollees to a cost sharing level based on their income.
Table 1: Elasticity Estimates from Previous Studies of the Individual Market
Coverage Own-Premium
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Pre-ACA Individual Market
Gruber and Poterba (1994) -0.5 to -1.0
Marquis and Long (1995) -0.3 to -0.6
Marquis et al. (2004) -0.2 to -0.4
CBO (2005) -0.57
Auerbach and Ohri (2006) -0.59
Massachusetts Connector
Chan and Gruber (2010) -0.65 to -0.72 -10.0 to -18.5
Ericson and Starc (2015) -12 to -36
Jaffe and Shepard (2017) -13.1 to -15.5 -27.2 to -30.6
Finkelstein et al. (2017) -5.2
ACA Exchanges
Tebaldi (2017) -1.5 to -4.0 -2.3 to -12.0
Frean et al. (2017) -0.05 to -0.09
Abraham et al. (2017) -1.7
Sacks (2017) -1.4
NOTES: Table reports premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand estimate from the individual
market literature. Studied settings include the pre-ACA individual market, the Massachusetts Connector,
and the ACA exchanges. Coverage elasticity estimates refer to impact of an increase in all premiums on
total demand. Own-premium elasticity estimates refer to the impact of an increase in a plan’s premium on
its own demand. Elasticities measure the percentage change in demand for a one percent increase in
premiums. Semi-elasticities measure the percentage change in demand for a $100 increase in annual
premiums.
Several recent studies consider the early experience of the ACA exchanges. Frean et al.
(2017) use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and Sacks (2017) uses data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to study take-up of exchange coverage. Abraham
et al. (2017) estimate a discrete choice model using plan-level data from the states using
the healthcare.gov platform. These studies find significantly smaller estimates of consumer
premium sensitivity compared to studies of the Massachusetts Connector. A limitation of
these studies is that they cannot match consumers to the menu of plans or premiums that
they face, potentially resulting in measurement error in the premium and penalty variables.
Tebaldi (2017) overcomes many of these issues by analyzing consumer-level data from the
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2014 plan year of the California ACA exchange, finding somewhat higher sensitivity to
premiums. I build on his analysis by using an additional year of data from the California
exchange, as well as data from the Washington exchange.
2.5. Other Contributions
I also contribute to the broader economic literature on health insurance. My analysis links
to recent work considering interactions between adverse selection and market power (Lustig,
2010; Starc, 2014; Ericson and Starc, 2015; Mahoney and Weyl, 2017). I contribute to the
empirical literature that examines the welfare impact of adverse selection in health insurance
markets (Cutler and Reber, 1998; Pauly and Herring, 2000; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Einav
et al., 2013; Handel, 2013; Hackmann et al., 2015). This study also adds to the economic
literature studying the early experience of the ACA exchanges (Tebaldi, 2017; Frean et al.,
2017; Abraham et al., 2017; Sacks, 2017).
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CHAPTER 3 : Background on the ACA
One of the key mechanisms for expanding health insurance under the ACA is the creation
of regulated state insurance exchanges, where insurers sell insurance plans directly to con-
sumers. Plans sold on the exchange are classified by their actuarial value (AV), i.e., the
expected percentage of health care costs that the insurance plan will cover. The four ac-
tuarial value or “metal” tiers are bronze (60 percent AV), silver (70 percent AV), gold (80
percent AV), and platinum (90 percent AV). Select individuals, mostly those under age 30,
can buy a more basic catastrophic plan. In most states, insurers can design their plans
with different cost sharing parameters (e.g., deductibles, coinsurance rates, copays, etc.),
as long as the plans have the advertised AV. One notable exception is California, where
plans within a metal tier are standardized to have the cost sharing design specified by the
California exchange. The standard benefit designs for the 2014 plan year are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: California Exchange Standard Plan Benefit Designs (2014)
Bronze Silver Gold
Plat-
inum
Silver
73
Silver
87
Silver
94
Actuarial value 60% 70% 80% 90% 73% 87% 94%
Deductible $5,000 $2,000 $0 $0 $1,500 $500 $0
Coinsurance 30% 20% 20% 10% 20% 15% 10%
PCP copay $60 $45 $30 $20 $40 $15 $3
Specialist copay $70 $65 $50 $40 $50 $20 $5
Out-of-pocket limit $6,350 $6,350 $6,350 $4,000 $5,200 $2,250 $2,250
Notes: Table summarizes the standard plan benefit designs in the California exchange for the 2014 plan
year. The silver 73, silver 87, and silver 94 plans are the enhanced versions of the basic silver plan and
reduce cost sharing for consumers who qualify for cost sharing subsidies.
The ACA restricts the ability of insurers to price discriminate to a consumer’s age, smoking
status, and geographic residence. Insurers can charge a 64-year old up to 3 times as much
as a 21-year old as shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, smokers can be charged 50 percent
more than non-smokers. Some states, including California but not Washington, prohibit
tobacco rating. Figure 2 shows the tobacco user surcharges for each insurer participating
in the Washington exchange and the share of smokers that they enroll. Insurers with lower
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Figure 1: ACA Restrictions on Premium Discrimination By Age
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Notes: Figure compares the ACA’s restrictions on premium discrimination between age groups (ACA
rating curve) with the average claims ratios between age groups (actual cost curve). The ACA rating curve
is published by CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013) and the actual cost ratios are
created from Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) data as analyzed by the Society of Actuaries (Yamamoto,
2013).
surcharges for tobacco users tend to attract larger shares of tobacco users in their risk pools.
Each state also defines geographic rating areas, usually composed of counties, in which an
insurer’s premiums must be the same for consumers of the same age and smoking status.
The rating area partitions for California and Washington are shown in Figure 3. Insurers
can opt to serve only part of a rating area.
Limitations on price discrimination can exacerbate adverse selection (Handel et al., 2015).
Below I consider both demand-side and supply-side policies implemented under the ACA
that are designed to mitigate the effects of adverse selection.
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Figure 2: Washington Insurer Tobacco Surcharges and Share of Tobacco Users in Risk Pool
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Notes: Figure shows the tobacco surcharges for each insurer participating in the Washington exchange and
the percentage of smokers in their pools. Insurers are permitted to charge up to a 50 percent surcharge on
smokers, but the largest surcharge in the Washington exchange was 20 percent.
13
Figure 3: Premium Rating Regions in California and Washington
Notes: Figure shows the premium rating regions in the California and Washington state exchanges
(Department of Managed Health Care, 2016; Office of the Insurance Commissioner Washington State,
2016). There are 19 rating areas in California and 5 rating areas in Washington.
3.1. Demand-Side Policies
Demand-side policies implemented under the ACA that target adverse selection include the
ACA’s individual mandate and premium subsidy design. The ACA’s individual mandate
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requires most individuals to purchase insurance or pay a penalty. Exemptions from the
individual mandate are made for certain groups, most notably for (1) those with income
below the tax filing threshold and (2) individuals who lack access to a health insurance plan
that is less than 8 percent of their income in 2014 and 8.05 percent of their income in 2015.
Exemptions are also made for those who would have been eligible for Medicaid but reside in
a state that did not expand Medicaid. The individual mandate penalty amount was phased
in between 2014 and 2016. The penalty for a single individual equaled the greater of $95
and 1 percent of income exceeding the filing threshold in 2014 and the greater of $325 and 2
percent of income exceeding the filing threshold in 2015, as shown in Figure 4. For the 2016
through 2018 plan years, the penalty for a single individual is the greater of $695 and 2.5
percent of income. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 sets the individual penalty amount
to zero starting in the 2019 plan year.
Another important policy that targets adverse selection is the ACA’s premium subsidy
design. In contrast to vouchers or fixed subsidies that do not adjust to premium changes,
the ACA’s premium subsidies are price-linked and adjust to premium changes. The amount
of the subsidy equals the difference between the premium of the benchmark plan and the
consumer’s income contribution cap. The benchmark plan is the second-cheapest silver plan
available to the consumer and may vary between consumers because of heterogeneous entry
into markets within a state exchange. The consumer’s income contribution cap ranged from
2 percent of annual income for a consumer earning 100 percent of FPL and 9.5 percent of
annual income for a consumer earning 400 percent of FPL in the 2014 plan year. The
contribution caps for a single person purchasing exchange coverage in 2014 are shown in
Figure 5. Consumers can apply the premium subsidy towards the premium of any metal
plan.
Premium subsidies are available to consumers who meet the following criteria: (1) have
income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), (2) have
citizenship or legal resident status, (3) are ineligible for public insurance such as Medicare,
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Figure 4: Individual Mandate Penalty by Income and by Year for a Single Person
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Notes: Figure shows the individual mandate penalty amount in the 2014 and 2015 plan years for a single
person.
Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and (4) lack access to an
“affordable plan offer” through employer-sponsored insurance either as an employee or as a
dependent. A plan is defined as affordable if the employee’s contribution to the employer’s
single coverage plan is less than 9.5 percent of the employee’s household income in 2014 and
9.56 percent of income in 2015.
Consumers with incomes less than or equal to 250 percent of poverty can also receive cost
sharing subsidies by purchasing a silver plan. As a consequence, silver is the most commonly
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Figure 5: Maximum Required Contribution Towards Benchmark Plan For A Single Person
in 2014
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Notes: Figure shows the maximum amount that a single person would have to contribute towards the
premium of the benchmark, second-cheapest silver plan in 2014. The subsidy equals the difference between
the premium of the second cheapest silver plan available to the consumer and the maximum contribution.
The subsidy can be used to purchase any metal plan in the exchange.
selected metal tier. Cost sharing subsidies increase the actuarial value of the silver plan
from 70 percent to 94, 87, and 73 percent for individuals with incomes below 150 percent
of FPL, 150 and 200 percent of FPL, and 200 and 250 percent of FPL, respectively.
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3.2. Supply-Side Policies
The ACA also includes three supply-side policies that target adverse selection: risk adjust-
ment, reinsurance, and risk corridors. Under the ACA’s risk adjustment program, firms
with lower-than-average risk make transfer payments to firms with a higher-than-average
risk such that net transfer payments sum to zero. The ACA’s zero-sum transfer design
contrasts with the design used in Medicare Advantage, where risk adjustment payments
are benchmarked to the risk of those choosing the outside option (i.e., traditional Medi-
care) and do not necessarily sum to zero. Risk adjustment occurs at the state level for
all firms participating in the individual market, including both exchange and off-exchange
individual plans. States have the option of merging the individual and small group markets
for purposes of risk adjustment, but only Vermont has done so. Risk adjustment therefore
reduces the incentives of firms to market in favorable geographic regions of the state or off
the exchanges.
In contrast to risk adjustment, reinsurance and risk corridors were temporary programs
in effect between 2014 and 2016 that sought to stabilize the exchanges during their initial
years of operation. Reinsurance provides “insurance for insurers” and helps to offset the
realized claims of high-utilization consumers. For the 2014 and 2015 plan years, the program
provided assistance to insurers with consumers who have claims exceeding $45, 000 in claims.
In total, the ACA reinsurance program made $10 billion, $6 billion, and $4 billion available
for reinsurance in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 plan years, respectively.
The final supply-side policy targeting adverse selection is the temporary risk corridor pro-
gram. Risk corridors reduce the variability of insurers’ final earnings or losses. Firms with
substantial profits pay into the program, while firms with large losses receive payments from
the program. In contrast to risk adjustment and reinsurance, the risk corridor program does
not affect an insurer’s expected profit, but rather the variability of its profit.
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CHAPTER 4 : Model
In this chapter, I develop a model of the ACA exchanges that I take to the data. I be-
gin with a basic, two-stage model where (1) insurers first set the premiums of their plans
simultaneously to maximize their expected profit and (2) consumers then select a plan to
maximize their expected utility. I then show how the individual mandate and risk adjust-
ment affect the market equilibrium. I complete the model by adding the other key ACA
policies which may interact with the individual mandate and risk adjustment.
4.1. Basic Exchange Model
4.1.1. Demand
I first consider the second-stage problem where households choose the plan that maximizes
utility. I model consumers as household units rather than individuals for three reasons: (1)
insurance decisions are likely to account for the health and financial needs of all household
members, (2) decisions between household members are likely to be highly correlated (e.g., a
5-year old child is unlikely to be making independent insurance decisions), and (3) subsidies
and penalties are calculated at the household level.
Define pij as household i’s premium for plan j. Denote di as a vector of demographic char-
acteristics, xj as a vector of observed product characteristics, ξj as a vector of unobserved
product characteristics, and ij as an error term with cumulative distribution function F (·).
Households choose the plan that maximizes their utility function
Uij ≡ αipij + x′jβ + d′iϕ+ ξj + ij (4.1)
where household i’s premium parameter αi equals
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αi = α+ d
′
iγ
The utility Ui0 of the outside option (i.e., forgoing insurance) equals zero. The specification
of utility equation (4.1) captures potential heterogeneity in preferences across demographic
groups. The demographic parameters ϕ indicate each demographic’s taste for exchange
insurance, all else equal, and are identified because they do not appear in the utility of the
outside option. The interaction term parameters γ indicate how premium sensitivity varies
by demographic group.
4.1.2. Supply and Equilibrium
I now use a differentiated products model to analyze the first-stage problem where insurers
set premiums to maximize expected profit. A risk-neutral profit-maximizing firm f sets the
premiums of its plans to maximize its expected profit
pif (p) = Rf (p)− Cf (p)− Vf − FCf (4.2)
where p is the vector of all exchange plan premiums, Rf (p) is total premium revenue
collected, Cf (p) is total medical claims incurred, Vf is variable administrative cost (e.g.,
commissions and taxes), and FCf is fixed administrative cost (e.g., overhead). Medical
claims depend on the composition of the firm’s risk pool, while administrative costs do not.
The first-order condition corresponding to (4.2) is given by
MRj(p) = MCj(p) + vf
∂qf (p)/∂pj
∂qj(p)/∂pj
(4.3)
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for each plan j offered by firm f , where MRj(p) is plan marginal revenue, MCj(p) is
plan marginal claims, vf is per-member variable administrative cost, qj(p) is plan j’s
demand, and qf (p) is firm f ’s total demand. The right-hand side of (4.3) is marginal
cost and consists of both marginal claims and variable administrative cost. The fraction
(∂qf (p)/∂pj)/(∂qj(p)/∂pj) lies in the interval [0, 1] and measures the degree to which con-
sumers substitute to plans offered by other firms if it increases the premium for plan j The
fraction equals 0 if there is no substitution and 1 if there is complete substitution to plans
offered by other firms.
Appendix B shows how every variable in the model can be written in terms of four variables
that I can estimate, including: (1) the probability qij(p) that household i selects plan j;
(2) the partial derivative ∂qik(p)/∂pij for all plans j and k; (3) the firm’s average claims
function cf (p); and (4) the vector of claim slopes with elements ∂cf (p)/∂pj . The claim slope
measures how firm average claims respond to a plan premium change and plays a key role in
determining the combined effect of adverse selection and moral hazard. Assuming no moral
hazard, large positive values of the claim slope indicate the presence of adverse selection,
while negative values of the claim slope indicate the presence of advantageous selection.
When moral hazard is present, the claim slope is likely to be negative for more generous
platinum plans; increases in platinum plan premiums are likely to incentivize consumers to
choose less generous plans or to select a plan offered by another firm. For a less generous
bronze plan, the claim slope is likely to be positive when moral hazard is present.
4.2. Adding the Individual Mandate
Suppose that a penalty is levied against consumers who do not purchase insurance. If con-
sumers are rational economic agents, the penalty should be viewed as the price of choosing
to forgo insurance. The utility of the outside option now equals
Ui0 = αiρi + i0 (4.4)
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where ρi is household i’s penalty under the individual mandate.
The individual mandate may elicit a behavioral response from consumers. For instance,
consumers may respond differently to the penalty than to the premium. I allow for this
possibility by considering an alternative specification where I replace the premium param-
eter αi in utility equation (4.4) with the penalty parameter α
′
i such that
Ui0 = α
′
iρi + i0 (4.5)
If αi = α
′
i, then consumers are equally sensitive to changes in the amount of the premium
and the penalty. In my empirical analysis, I test whether αi = α
′
i.
Another possible behavioral response is that consumers could be sensitive to the existence of
the penalty. For example, consumers might have a taste for complying with the mandate or
a distaste for paying a fine. To define the taste for compliance with the individual mandate,
let the vector of demographic variables di in utility equation (4.1) contain a variable dmi
with coefficient ϕm that indicates whether household i is subject to the individual mandate.
Denote Umi as household i’s utility when it is subject to the mandate and U
n
i as its utility
when it is exempt or the mandate is repealed.1 I define the taste for compliance τi as
the compensating variation that restores household i’s utility from Uni to U
m
i when the
individual mandate is repealed. A taste for compliance exists if Umi > U
n
i , which implies
the mandate parameter ϕm > 0. Under utility equation (4.1), the taste for compliance can
be computed in dollars as
τi =
Umi − Uni
αi
=
ϕm
αi
(4.6)
1I drop the j subscript because the taste for compliance does not depend on the chosen exchange plan.
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In my empirical analysis, I test whether the mandate parameter ϕm > 0.
4.3. Adding Risk Adjustment
To add risk adjustment to the model, I first define the risk adjustment transfer. The
objective of the transfer is to equalize the risk borne by each firm. At first glance, it might
seem that this objective could be accomplished by setting firm f ’s transfer equal to the
difference between its total incurred claims Cf (p) and its market share of total claims C(p)
across all firms. When added to the firm’s expected profit function, this transfer would
replace the firm’s total incurred claims with its market share of total claims across all firms.
Every firm would face the average claims in the market instead of its own average claims.
There are two problems with this strategy: (1) plans vary in their cost sharing obligations
and (2) claims are not necessarily equal to risk. First, a plan with lower cost sharing will
have higher expected claims than a plan with higher cost sharing, even if consumers enrolled
in the two plans have the same risk. To address this issue, I define the firm’s risk-adjusted
market share sf (p) of total claims. The firm’s risk-adjusted share takes into account the
generosity of selected plans and any moral hazard associated with choosing a more generous
plan. Second, I define the firm’s efficiency score φf to account for all unobserved factors
that may cause a firm’s net cost after risk adjustment to deviate from its risk-adjusted
market share of total claims across all firms. The efficiency score may represent a firm’s
bargaining power or ability to exploit the risk adjustment formula. Firms with a higher-
than-average efficiency score have φf > 1 and firms with a lower-than-average efficiency
score have φf < 1. The risk adjustment transfer can be written as
RAf (p) = φfCf (p)− sf (p)C(p) (4.7)
Formula (4.7) indicates that the transfer equals the plan’s expected claims (scaled by the
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plan’s efficiency score) minus its risk-adjusted share of total claims. If its incurred claims
are greater than its risk-adjusted market share of total claims, the plan receives a risk
adjustment transfer payment. Conversely, the plan makes a transfer payment if its incurred
claims are less than its risk-adjusted market share of total claims. Importantly, the risk
adjustment transfers net to zero such that
∑
f RAf (p) = 0.
Adding the risk adjustment transfer to the firm’s profit function yields
pif (p) = Rf (p)− sf (p)C(p)− (1− φf )Cf (p)− Vf − FCf (4.8)
The corresponding first-order condition is given by
MRj(p) = MCj(p) + (1− φf )MCj(p) + vf ∂qf (p)/∂pj
∂qj(p)/∂pj
(4.9)
for each plan j offered by the firm. With some abuse of terminology, I refer to MCj(p) as
“average marginal claims,” which are what plan j’s marginal claims would have been if its
enrollees had average risk. Average marginal claims differ by plan for two reasons: (1) there
is a selection effect that depends on the slope of its average cost curve and (2) expected
marginal claims decrease with greater cost sharing. A comparison of equation (4.3) with
equation (4.9) reveals how risk adjustment changes firm incentives. Assuming the efficiency
score φf = 1, firms respond to what their plans’ expected marginal claims would be if their
enrollees were average risk, rather than the expected marginal claims of their risk pools.
For firms that draw enrollees with lower-than-average risk, risk adjustment raises marginal
cost. Conversely, firms with higher-than-average risk face lower marginal cost under risk
adjustment. Equation (4.9) indicates that profit-maximizing firms adjust their premiums
to reflect these changes in marginal cost.
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The risk adjustment formula used in the ACA setting differs slightly from formula (4.7).
Appendix C derives the ACA risk adjustment transfer formula and price equilibrium.
4.3.1. Examples
I now use the model to show how risk adjustment can either enhance or reduce social
welfare. Risk adjustment may reduce social welfare if (1) premiums and expected risk are
positively correlated and (2) firm cost and adverse selection are negatively correlated. Risk
adjustment is likely to compress premiums, making cheaper plans more expensive and more
expensive plans cheaper, if premiums without risk adjustment are positively correlated with
expected risk. Low-risk consumers may exit the exchange in response to higher premiums
for cheaper plans if those plans face stronger adverse selection.
To illustrate these predictions in the context of the model, I construct a simple example
where premiums and expected risk are positively correlated and firm cost and adverse
selection are negatively correlated. There are two insurers, L and H, that each sell a single
plan with the same actuarial value. Risk adjustment is the only policy in place to mitigate
the effects of adverse selection. Risk rating is completely prohibited such that firms L
and H must charge all consumers the community-rated premiums pL and pH , respectively.
The firms have the same bargaining power and ability to exploit risk adjustment such that
φL = φH = 1 and there are no administrative or fixed costs.
To complete the setup of the example, I specify the firms’ demand and average claims
equations. The firms have the symmetric linear demand functions
qL(p) = a− e1pL + e2pH
qH(p) = a+ e2pL − e1pH (4.10)
where a > 0 and e1 > e2 > 0 such that the own-premium effect exceeds the cross-premium
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effect. I assume that firms L and H have the asymmetric linear average claims functions
cL(p) = κ− λ1qL(p)
cH(p) = κ− λ2qH(p) (4.11)
where the intercept κ > 0 and the slope λ1 > λ2 > 0.
The demand equations (4.10) and the average claims equations (4.11) imply that the level
of demand is symmetric, but the risk composition of demand may differ. The functional
form of the average claims equations (4.11) has two important implications. First, firm
L has weakly lower cost than firm H if the two firms charge the same premium. Firm
L’s lower cost may reflect its superior ability to attract low-risk consumers through means
such as targeted advertising or strategic marketing. Second, it follows from the parameter
constraint λ1 > λ2 > 0 that firm L faces stronger adverse selection, which means that the
expected cost of its marginal consumer is more sensitive to premium changes. Firm L’s
aggressive targeting of low-risk consumers may result in greater sensitivity of the expected
cost of its marginal consumer to premium changes. The strength of adverse selection can
be represented mathematically as the magnitude of the slope of the marginal claims curves,
MCL(pL, BRH(pL)) and MCH(BRL(pH), pH), where BRL(·) and BRH(·) are the best
response functions for firm L and H, respectively. Firm L faces stronger adverse selection
because the magnitude of the slope of its marginal claims curve (with respect to quantity)
equals 2λ1, while the magnitude of the slope of firm H’s marginal claims curve equals 2λ2.
The left panel of Figure 6 provides a visual representation of the firms’ marginal claims
functions. Firm L’s marginal cost curve lies below firm H’s marginal cost curve and has a
steeper slope.
Before presenting the formal argument for why risk adjustment reduces welfare in this
example, I first give an intuitive argument using Figure 7. Risk adjustment rotates firm L’s
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Figure 6: Effect of Risk Adjustment on Firm Marginal Claims
Notes: Figure shows how risk adjustment affects the firms’ marginal claims curves
MCL ≡MCL(pL, BRH(pL)) and MCH ≡MCH(BRL(pH), pH). The left panel corresponds to the first
example where firms have the average claims functions given in (4.11). Firm L has lower marginal claims
and faces stronger adverse selection, as indicated by its steeper marginal cost curve as a function of
quantity. Risk adjustment rotates firm L’s marginal claims curve upwards and firm H’s marginal claims
curve downwards such that both have the same marginal claims function MC. The right panel
corresponds to the second example where firms have the average claims functions given in (4.12). Firm L
still has lower marginal claims, but faces weaker adverse selection than firm H.
marginal claims curve upwards and firm H’s marginal claims curve downwards such that
both have the same marginal claims function MC. Both demand and claims are symmetric
under risk adjustment. Hence, the firms set the same premium in equilibrium; firm L’s
premium increases and firm H’s premium decreases. Average claims risk in the market
increases because the expected cost of firm L’s marginal consumer is more responsive to
premium changes than the expected cost of firm H’s marginal consumer (i.e., firm L faces
greater adverse selection). Total coverage in the market falls because of the adverse changes
in the risk mix of consumers. Higher average premiums and less coverage reduce consumer
welfare, as shown in Figure 7 by comparing the relative sizes of the shaded regions for firms
L and H. Firm profit increases for firm H and decreases for firm L. Total industry profit
declines because risk adjustment increases the proportion of insured consumers covered by
the less cost efficient firm (i.e., firm H). The net impact of risk adjustment on social welfare
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is negative.
Figure 7: Impact of Risk Adjustment When Adverse Selection and Firm Cost Are Negatively
Correlated
Notes: Figure shows how risk adjustment affects the equilibrium between two imperfectly competitive
firms L and H, where firm L has lower marginal cost and faces stronger adverse selection. Risk adjustment
gives both firms the same marginal claims curve MC and marginal revenue curve MR. Firm L’s enrollee
population declines by a larger amount than the amount that firm H’s enrollee population increases. Firm
L’s premium also increases by more than firm H’s premium decreases. The loss in consumer surplus for
firm L’s plan exceeds the gain in consumer surplus for firm H’s plan, as indicated by the relative sizes of
the shaded regions.
Now I formalize the argument. Define consumer surplus for the two firms as
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CSL(p) ≡
∫ p0L
pL
qL(x, pH)dx = 0.5(p0L − pL)qL(p)
CSH(p) ≡
∫ p0H
pH
qH(pL, x)dx = 0.5(p0H − pH)qH(p)
where p0L ≡ (a+ e2pH)/e1 and p0H ≡ (a+ e2pL)/e1 are the premiums that equate firm L’s
and firm H’s quantity to 0, respectively. Denote piL(p) as the profit function for firm L and
piH(p) as the profit function for firm H. The social welfare function SW (p) sums consumer
surplus and profit across the two firms. Proposition 4.3.1 characterizes the welfare impact
of risk adjustment in this example.
Proposition 4.3.1. Let the set of firms F = {L,H} and suppose firm demand is given by
(4.10) and firm claims are given by (4.11) where a > 0, e1 > e2 > 0, κ > 0 and λ1 > λ2 > 0.
Suppose that the parameter constraints (A.1) and (A.2) in Appendix A are satisfied such
that the problem is well-defined. Define (p∗L, p
∗
H) as the equilibrium premium vector in a
market without risk adjustment and (pRL , p
R
H) as the equilibrium premium vector in a market
with risk adjustment. Then risk adjustment
1. Increases the average premium such that pRL + p
R
H > p
∗
L + p
∗
H
2. Decreases insurance coverage such that qL(p
R
L , p
R
H)+qH(p
R
L , p
R
H) < qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)+qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
3. Increases average claims such that cL(p
R
L , p
R
H)+cH(p
R
L , p
R
H) > cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)+cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
4. Decreases consumer surplus such that CSL(p
R
L , p
R
H) +CSH(p
R
L , p
R
H) < CSL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) +
CSH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
5. Decreases total profit such that piL(p
R
L , p
R
H) + piH(p
R
L , p
R
H) < piL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + piH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
6. Decreases social welfare such that SW (pRL , p
R
H) < SW (p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The key to the negative welfare result in Proposition 4.3.1 is negative correlation between
firm cost and adverse selection that leads to the departure of low-risk consumers from the
exchange. If instead firm cost and adverse selection are positively correlated, the impact
of risk adjustment on welfare could be positive. Instead of (4.11), suppose firms L and H
have the linear average claims functions
cL(p) = λ2κ− λ2qL(p)
cH(p) = λ1κ− λ1qH(p) (4.12)
where κ > 0 and λ1 > λ2 > 0. Firm L still has lower marginal claims, but now faces
weaker adverse selection because λ1 > λ2. This situation could arise if the benefits of firm
L’s strategic marketing to low-risk consumers spill over to firm H by increasing general
awareness and interest in exchange coverage. The spillover effect increases as more low-risk
consumers opt into the market and the difference between the firms’ marginal cost curves
narrows at higher quantities, as shown in the right panel of Figure 6. Figure 8 shows that
total coverage in the market increases. Lower average premiums and expanded coverage en-
hance consumer welfare, as shown in Figure 8 by comparing the relative sizes of the shaded
regions for firms L and H. As in the previous example, firm L’s profit declines, firm H’s
profit increases, and total industry profit declines. The net impact of risk adjustment on
social welfare is ambiguous. Proposition 4.3.2 formalizes these results. Table 3 summarizes
the equilibrium and welfare results for the two examples.
Proposition 4.3.2. Let the set of firms F = {L,H} and suppose firm demand is given by
(4.10) and firm claims are given by (4.12) where a > 0, e1 > e2 > 0, κ > 0 and λ1 > λ2 > 0.
Suppose that the parameter constraints (A.3) and (A.4) in Appendix A are satisfied such
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Figure 8: Impact of Risk Adjustment When Adverse Selection and Firm Cost Are Positively
Correlated
Notes: Figure shows how risk adjustment affects the equilibrium between two imperfectly competitive
firms L and H, where firm L has lower marginal cost and faces weaker adverse selection. Risk adjustment
gives both firms the same marginal claims curve MC and marginal revenue curve MR. Firm L’s enrollee
population declines by a smaller amount than the amount that firm H’s enrollee population increases.
Firm L’s premium also increases by less than firm H’s premium decreases. The loss in consumer surplus
for firm L’s plan is less than the gain in consumer surplus for firm H’s plan, as indicated by the relative
sizes of the shaded regions.
that the problem is well-defined. Define (p∗L, p
∗
H) as the equilibrium premium vector in a
market without risk adjustment and (pRL , p
R
H) as the equilibrium premium vector in a market
with risk adjustment. Then risk adjustment
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1. Decreases the average premium such that pRL + p
R
H < p
∗
L + p
∗
H
2. Increases insurance coverage such that qL(p
R
L , p
R
H)+qH(p
R
L , p
R
H) > qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)+qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
3. Decreases the average claims risk such that cL(p
R
L , p
R
H) + cH(p
R
L , p
R
H) < cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) +
cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
4. Increases consumer surplus such that CSL(p
R
L , p
R
H) + CSH(p
R
L , p
R
H) > CSL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) +
CSH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
5. Decreases total profit such that piL(p
R
L , p
R
H) + piH(p
R
L , p
R
H) < piL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + piH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Table 3: Summary of Results on the Effect of Risk Adjustment
Negative Correlation
Between Adverse Selection
and Firm Cost
Positive Correlation
Between Adverse Selection
and Firm Cost
Average Premium Increases Decreases
Average Claims Increases Decreases
Total Coverage Decreases Increases
Welfare
Consumer Surplus Decreases Increases
Profit Decreases Decreases
Total Decreases Ambiguous
Notes: Table summarizes the impact of risk adjustment in the two examples considered above. The first
column corresponds to the example where the firms have average claims given by (4.11), while the second
column corresponds to the example where the firms have average claims given by (4.12).
These examples suggest that the welfare impact of risk adjustment depends on whether risk
adjustment changes premiums such that cheaper plans become more expensive and low-risk
consumers exit the market as a result. Other policies that I have omitted in these examples
could prevent the loss of low-risk consumers that may result from risk adjustment. Price-
linked subsidies provide an implicit source of external funding to mitigate the potential loss
of low-risk consumers. Even though risk adjustment may increase premiums for bronze and
silver plans, price-linked ACA subsidies shield consumers from premium increases. In my
empirical analysis, I explore how the ACA’s subsidy design interacts with risk adjustment.
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4.4. Completing the ACA Exchange Model
In this section, I complete the model of the ACA exchanges by incorporating the other
key ACA policies that may interact with the individual mandate and risk adjustment. To
include the ACA’s price discrimination regulations, I define the household’s rating factor
ri, which accounts for the age, smoking status, and geographic residence of the household’s
members. The product of the household’s rating factor and the insurer’s base premium pj
equals the household’s full, unsubsidized premium for plan j.
Another important policy is the ACA’s premium subsidies. Under the ACA, the subsidy
is equal to the difference between the premium pb of the benchmark, second-cheapest sil-
ver plan and the household’s income contribution cap ci. The consumer’s premium pij is
calculated as
pij = max

ripj︸︷︷︸
full
premium
−max{pb − ci, 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
subsidy
, 0

(4.13)
The inner max operator in equation (4.13) is necessary because the premium of the bench-
mark plan could be less than the household’s contribution cap and the subsidy must be
nonnegative. For instance, the contribution cap might exceed the premium of the bench-
mark plan for younger consumers who face lower premiums or those with income close to
400 percent of FPL who have a relatively high contribution cap. The outer max operator in
equation (4.13) is necessary because the subsidy could exceed the premium of a bronze plan
or the cheapest silver plan and the consumer’s premium must be nonnegative. About 45
percent of consumers in California and 39 percent of consumers in Washington had access
to at least one “free” plan for which the subsidy covered the entire premium (see Table 4).
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I also include reinsurance in the model. Let τf be the actuarial value of the reinsurance
contract (i.e., the expected percentage of claims that the reinsurer will pay). The insurer’s
expected profit function becomes
pif (p) = Rf (p)− sf (p)C(p)− (1− φf − τf )Cf (p)− Vf − FCf (4.14)
For each plan j offered by the firm, the corresponding first-order condition is given by
MRj(p) = MCj(p) + (1− φf − τf )MCj(p) + vf ∂qf (p)/∂pj
∂qj(p)/∂pj
(4.15)
One policy that I do not model is the risk corridor program. The risk corridor program
limits an insurer’s potential gains and losses, but does not affect the profit-maximizing
premium. Hence, risk-neutral insurers would not adjust their premiums in response to the
risk corridor program. In reality, insurers are not risk neutral and need to build claim
reserves to cover unexpected liabilities. The risk corridor program is also likely to affect
insurer entry decisions, which I assume to be exogenous in the model.
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CHAPTER 5 : Data
To estimate the model, I use demand and cost data from three main sources: (1) consumer-
level administrative data from the California and Washington ACA insurance exchanges, (2)
survey data from the American Community Survey (ACS), and (3) financial data reports
published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
One of the distinguishing features of my empirical analysis is the use of detailed consumer-
level administrative data to estimate demand for health insurance. I obtain data from
Covered California and the Washington Health Benefit Exchange (WAHBE), the ACA
exchanges in California and Washington, respectively. The data indicate each enrollee’s
selected plan for the 2014 and 2015 plan years and key demographic information, including
age, income, county of residence, subsidy eligibility, and household composition. These
demographic characteristics and rating factors from the insurer rate filings (Department of
Managed Health Care, 2016; Office of the Insurance Commissioner Washington State, 2016)
enable me to (1) define the household’s complete menu of plan choices and (2) precisely
calculate the household-specific premium pij from the insurer’s base premium pj for all
plans. Defining the consumer’s choice set and obtaining accurate consumer-specific premium
information are the primary empirical challenges in analyzing individual health insurance
markets (Auerbach and Ohri, 2006). Additional demographic variables that are available
for Washington include race, smoking status, and coverage start and end dates. Individual
and household identifiers allow consumers to be grouped into household units and tracked
across time. There are approximately 2.5 million unique records in the California data and
335, 000 unique records in the Washington data across the two plan years.
To form the universe of potential exchange consumers, I use data from the 2014 and 2015
ACS (Ruggles et al., 2016). I apply several criteria to select the ACS sample: (1) I exclude
any individuals enrolled in or eligible for another source of coverage, such as Medicaid, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and employer-sponsored insurance and (2)
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I exclude undocumented immigrants who are ineligible to purchase exchange insurance. I
merge the remaining California and Washington ACS survey records with the administrative
data from California and Washington, respectively.
Table 4 displays summary statistics for California and Washington consumers. The silver
tier is the most commonly selected option because consumers eligible for cost sharing re-
ductions (CSRs) must choose a silver plan to receive CSRs. Approximately 68 percent of
California enrollees and 61 percent of Washington enrollees are eligible for CSRs, while 91
percent of California enrollees and 85 percent of Washington enrollees are eligible for pre-
mium subsidies. The proportion of consumers exempt from the individual mandate is small,
but is notably higher among those who are uninsured. The uninsured rate is substantially
higher among young adults and males in both states. Smokers and certain minority groups
in Washington are also more likely to be uninsured. Individuals with incomes between 250
and 400 percent of FPL, who receive relatively small subsidies, and those with incomes
above 400 percent of FPL, who are ineligible for subsidies, make up a large share of the
uninsured population.
Table 5 summarizes the demand data by firm market share. Relative to other ACA state
exchanges, the California and Washington exchanges have robust firm participation. In
California, there are four dominant firms – Anthem, Blue Shield, Centene, and Kaiser –
that together have 95% of the market share. The other California firms largely serve local
markets. Premera Blue Cross, along with its affiliate Lifewise, is the dominant insurer in
Washington. Other large Washington insurers include Centene and Kaiser.
Data on firm costs come from the 2014 and 2015 medical loss ratio (MLR) reports published
by CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017). To comply with the ACA’s
medical loss ratio requirements, every insurer must provide CMS with detailed financial
information that is used to calculate MLR rebates and risk corridor payments. The MLR
reports provide state-level information on firm claims, variable administrative cost, and
fixed administrative cost for each firm. I also obtain data on firm reinsurance recoveries
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Table 4: Choice and Demographic Distribution by State
California Washington
Exchange Uninsured Exchange Uninsured
Metals
Catastrophic 0.7% 0.4%
Bronze 24.0% 36.6%
Silver 64.9% 55.1%
Gold 5.5% 7.7%
Platinum 4.8% 0.2%
Network Type
HMO 45.7% 38.5%
PPO 45.1% 61.4%
EPO 9.2% 0.0%
Access to free plan 45.4% 19.3% 33.0% 13.6%
Income
0% to 138% of FPL 2.9% 2.8% 5.0% 4.3%
138% to 150% of FPL 15.0% 5.4% 8.5% 4.6%
150% to 200% of FPL 33.8% 20.5% 30.3% 18.0%
200% to 250% of FPL 17.4% 16.2% 18.7% 17.3%
250% to 400% of FPL 22.7% 29.6% 25.0% 30.9%
400%+ of FPL 8.2% 25.4% 12.5% 25.0%
Subsidy Eligibility
Premium tax credits 90.7% 74.6% 85.5% 75.0%
Cost sharing reduction subsidies 68.5% 44.9% 61.4% 44.2%
Penalty Status
Exempt 3.8% 6.3% 5.3% 9.5%
Subject 96.2% 93.7% 94.7% 90.5%
Age
0-17 4.8% 3.2% 0.3% 2.9%
18-25 10.4% 20.9% 8.5% 19.1%
26-34 15.7% 25.5% 17.5% 25.2%
35-44 15.6% 17.0% 17.4% 19.9%
45-54 24.4% 17.8% 22.6% 16.6%
55-64 29.0% 15.4% 33.8% 16.3%
Gender
Female 52.3% 43.1% 54.1% 40.8%
Male 47.7% 56.9% 45.9% 59.2%
Race
Asian 14.9% 8.8%
Black/African American 2.9% 3.6%
Other Race 5.4% 12.1%
White 76.8% 75.5%
Smoking Status
Non-Smoker 91.1% 70.2%
Smoker 8.9% 29.8%
Year
2014 48.9% 58.9% 48.0% 56.5%
2015 51.1% 41.1% 52.0% 43.5%
Average Annual Population 1,239,268 1,407,430 168,785 218,797
NOTES: Table provides summary statistics on consumers in the California and Washington exchange
markets for the 2014 and 2015 plan years. Data on exchange consumers come from Covered California and
the Washington Health Benefit Exchange. Data on the uninsured come from the ACS.
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Table 5: Insurer Market Share in the California and Washington Exchanges
California Washington
2014 2015 2014 2015
Anthem Blue Cross 29.0% 27.8%
Blue Shield of California 28.3% 26.4%
BridgeSpan Health 1.8% 6.8%
Centene/Health Net 19.7% 16.4% 17.8% 21.5%
Chinese Community Health Plan 1.1% 0.8%
Community Health Plan 1.8% 0.8%
Contra Costa Health Plan 0.1%
Kaiser Permanente/Group Health 17.4% 24.2% 17.3% 16.1%
L.A. Care Health Plan 2.3% 1.1%
Moda Health 4.9%
Molina Healthcare/Columbia 0.7% 1.5% 1.2% 3.1%
Premera Blue Cross/Lifewise 60.0% 46.7%
Sharp Health Care 1.0% 1.2%
Valley Health Plan 0.1% 0.1%
Western Health Advantage 0.3% 0.4%
Notes: Table reports market shares for firms participating in the California and Washington exchanges
during the 2014 and 2015 plan years.
and risk adjustment transfers from CMS reports (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices, 2015, 2016). Table 6 and Table 7 summarize firm average claims and per-member
per-month risk adjustment transfers and reinsurance recoveries in California and Washing-
ton, respectively. The data on per-member per-month risk adjustment transfers indicate
that there is significant variation in the composition of the insurers’ risk pools. In Cali-
fornia, insurers such as Contra Costa and Sharp attracted much higher-than-average risk
consumers, while those enrolled in plans sold by Chinese Community, L.A. Care, and Molina
had lower-than-average risk. In Washington, Community Health Plan attracted very high
risk consumers, while Centene’s pool had much lower-than-average risk.
Although I do not directly observe the efficiency scores, I can solve for them in the ACA
risk adjustment transfer formula (A.8) using data on realized firm risk adjustment transfers,
claims, premiums, and risk-adjusted shares. The utilization factors used in calculating the
risk-adjusted share come directly from the formula used by CMS (Pope et al., 2014).
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Table 6: Summary Financial Data by Year in California
Average Claims Risk Adj. Received Reinsurance Received
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015
Anthem $294 $349 -$26 -$4 $58 $44
Blue Shield $338 $378 $24 $26 $63 $40
Centene/Health Net $306 $365 -$17 -$23 $54 $43
Chinese Community $212 $160 -$119 -$185 $13 $17
Contra Costa $912 $179 $234
Kaiser/Group Health $344 $336 $17 -$11 $40 $26
LA Care $196 $177 -$132 -$126 $1 $1
Molina $114 $141 -$126 -$130 $13 $6
Sharp $515 $458 $85 $42 $90 $42
Valley $430 $391 -$21 -$5 $29 $22
Western Health $569 $425 $63 -$21 $143 $74
NOTES: Table presents California insurer financial data for the 2014 and 2015 plan years on per-member
per-month claims, risk adjustment received, and reinsurance received. Claims data are from the MLR
reports. Risk adjustment and reinsurance data are from CMS reports (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2015, 2016).
Table 7: Summary Financial Data by Year in Washington
Average Claims Risk Adj. Received Reinsurance Received
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015
BridgeSpan $583 $405 $206 $25 $122 $30
Centene/Health Net $147 $155 -$104 -$103 $14 $10
Community Health $986 $1,156 $372 $438 $303 $606
Kaiser/Group Health $287 $324 $3 -$14 $58 $62
Moda $531 $30 $41
Molina/Columbia $505 $337 $216 $30 $77 $27
Premera/Lifewise $287 $364 -$21 -$2 $51 $51
NOTES: Table presents Washington insurer financial data for the 2014 and 2015 plan years on per-member
per-month claims, risk adjustment received, and reinsurance received. Claims data are from the MLR
reports. Risk adjustment and reinsurance data are from CMS reports (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2015, 2016).
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CHAPTER 6 : Estimation
In this chapter, I explain how I use the data to estimate the model. Recall that every
variable in the model is defined in terms of four variables: (1) the probability qij(p) that
household i selects plan j; (2) the partial derivative ∂qik(p)/∂pij for all plans j and k; (3)
the firm’s average claims function cf (p); and (4) the vector of claim slopes with elements
∂cf (p)/∂pj . In the first section, I discuss how I estimate the demand function and its
partial derivative with respect to the consumer’s premium. The second section explains
how I use the demand estimates to estimate the average claims function and the vector of
claim slopes.
6.1. Estimating Demand
To estimate demand, I model equation (4.1) as a nested logit at the consumer level, where
the vector of error terms i has the generalized extreme value distribution. I create two nests:
1) a nest containing all exchange plans and 2) a nest containing only the outside option. This
two-nest structure addresses the potential concern that a logit model might overestimate
substitution to the outside option because of its proportional substitution assumption. A
natural alternative would be to model each metal tier as a nest, along with the outside
option nest. I use the two-nest structure because the primary observed substitution pattern
is between the silver tier and the outside option due to the ACA’s linkage of cost sharing
subsidies to the purchase of silver plans. The household choice probabilities are computed
as
qij(p;θ) =
eVij/λ
(∑
j e
Vij/λ
)λ−1
1 +
(∑
j e
Vij/λ
)λ (6.1)
where θ is the vector of parameters in equation (4.1), Vij = αipij + x
′
jβ + d
′
iϕ + ξj , and λ
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is the nesting parameter for the exchange nest. I use maximum likelihood to estimate the
value of θ that maximizes the log-likelihood function
LL(θ) =
∑
i,j
wicij ln qij(p;θ)
where wi is the household’s weight and cij takes 1 if household i chose plan j and 0 otherwise.
With the estimated parameter vector θ, I can estimate household i’s demand qij(p) for plan
j and its partial derivatives ∂qik(p)/∂pij for all plans k.
The main empirical issue with estimating equation (4.1) is that the premium may be en-
dogenous. Premiums vary across insurers, markets, and households. Unobserved product
characteristics that vary at the insurer-market level, including insurer entry decisions, cus-
tomer service, provider networks, formularies, and advertising, could be correlated with
premiums. Including insurer-market fixed effects in equation (4.1) can control for these
unobservables. Ho and Pakes (2014) and Tebaldi (2017) follow a similar approach. The
inclusion of fixed effects still permits estimation of the premium parameter in utility equa-
tion (4.1) because premiums also vary across households and I estimate demand at the
household-level.
ACA regulations create exogenous variation in household premiums that I can exploit to
identify the effect of the premium on the household’s choice. Specifically, I can use the
following sources of variation: (1) the upper income limit for subsidy eligibility that creates
a discontinuity in household premiums at 400 percent of FPL; (2) the 57 percent increase
in the age rating curve that creates a discontinuity in premiums between ages 20 and 21
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013); (3) the individual mandate exemption
for having income below the tax filing threshold; (4) the individual mandate exemption
for not having access to an affordable offer; and (5) the increase in penalty assessments
between 2014 and 2015. Figures 11-14 in Appendix D provide reduced-form evidence of
how these exogenous shocks affect demand for exchange coverage. Exchange enrollment is
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particularly responsive to the upper income limit for subsidy eligibility and the tax filing
threshold exemption from the individual mandate.
Consumer-level variation in premiums is a nonlinear function of age, tobacco usage (in
Washington only), geographic residence, and household income. I include controls in the
utility function for all of these characteristics. If consumers can manipulate any of these
characteristics that affect premiums, variation in consumer-level premiums could be endoge-
nous. Age is not manipulable and it is unlikely that consumers will relocate to find lower
exchange premiums. In recent work, Friedman et al. (2016) find that the ACA’s smoking
surcharges reduced takeup among smokers, but did not affect smoking rates. Income is the
characteristic that consumers are most likely to maniupate. For instance, households might
try to keep their income below the 400 percent of poverty threshold for subsidy eligibility.
DeLeire et al. (2017) find minimal evidence of income manipulation in their analysis of cost
sharing subsidies.
As a robustness check, I also estimate a nested logit discrete choice model with the control
function approach of Petrin and Train (2010). Although the approach of Berry et al. (1995)
is more commonly used for addressing price endogeneity in discrete choice models, significant
household-level variation in premiums for the same product and in penalty assessments
precludes applying the key insight of Berry et al. (1995): absorbing the premium endogeneity
into product-level constants. I estimate the first stage at the plan-market-year level by
regressing the premium pjnt for plan j in rating area n in year t on instruments zjnt,
where the instrument vector includes (1) the non-premium product characteristics; (2)
the geographic cost factors reported in state rate filings; and (3) the average premium
that the insurer charges for j in other ratings areas in the same year. I calculate each
household’s predicted premium from the first stage and then compute the residuals µij . I
make the assumption that (µij , ξij) are jointly normal, which implies that ξij |µij is also
normal with mean υµij and variance ψ
2 (υ and ψ are parameters to be estimated). Setting
the unobservables ξij = E[ξij |µij ] + ξ˜ij to “control” for potential correlations between µij
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and ξij , I rewrite demand equation (4.1) as
Uij = αipij + x
′
jβ + d
′
iϕ+ E[ξij |µij ] + ξ˜ij + ij
= αipij + x
′
jβ + d
′
iϕ+ υµij + ψηij + ij (6.2)
where ηij ∼ N(0, 1). The household choice probabilities can be computed as
qij(p;θ) =
∫ eVij/λ
(∑
j e
Vij/λ
)λ−1
1 +
(∑
j e
Vij/λ
)λ
 dG(·) (6.3)
where θ is the vector of parameters in (6.2), Vij = αipij + x
′
jβ + d
′
iϕ + υµij + ψηij , and
G(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function for ξij |µij . I estimate the integral in
equation (6.3) using simulation. I then use maximum simulated likelihood to estimate the
value of θ that maximizes the log-likelihood function.
6.2. Estimating Claims
To estimate each firm’s average claims function and vector of claim slopes, I develop a
strategy that combines my demand estimates with firm-level data from several sources,
including the MLR reports. Previous work typically assumes that the claims function is
linear (Einav et al., 2010), implying that the claim slope ∂cf (p)∂pj does not vary with
premiums. Because the medical spending distribution is highly skewed, it is possible that
the rate of change in average claims varies with the premium. To allow for this possibility,
I specify a more flexible average claims function with the quadratic form
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cf (p) =
∑
k∈Jf
[
1
2
b1p
2
k + b2xkpk
]
+ df (6.4)
where xk is a vector of observed plan characteristics (including the plan actuarial value,
whether the plan is a health maintenance organization (HMO), and whether the plan allows
enrollees to establish a health savings account (HSA)), and df is an intercept. The total
derivative of (6.4) equals
dcf (p) =
∑
k∈Jf
∂cf (p)
∂pk
dpk =
∑
k∈Jf
[b1pk + b2xk] dpk
where the claim slope ∂cf (p)/∂pk = b1pk + b2xk is linear in the premium pk and product
characteristics xk. Given data on each plan’s claim slope, premium, and product character-
istics, I can estimate the claims function parameters b1 and b2 by regressing the claim slope
on the premium and product characteristics. I estimate these parameters using ordinary
least squares, as well as two-stage least squares to address potential endogeneity of the
premium. I use the instruments suggested by Berry et al. (1995) that measure each plan’s
isolation in the product space. I recover the claims function intercept df for each firm using
the observed averaged claims and the predicted claim slopes as the initial condition.
The main empirical challenge with this approach is that I do not observe the claim slope
∂cf (p)/∂pj . To obtain estimates of the claim slope, I assume that the exchanges are in
equilibrium, allowing me to invert first-order conditions (A.10) to obtain non-parametric
estimates of average marginal claims. I then solve for the claim slopes in formula (A.7).
Inversion of the first-order conditions is possible because I have written the model such that
the system of first-order conditions is full rank. In particular, formula (A.7) for average
marginal claims does not necessitate knowledge of the claims cross-partial derivatives (i.e.,
how a firm’s average claims respond to the base premium of plans sold by one of a firm’s
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competitors). In the industrial organization literature, inversion of the first-order conditions
is often used to back out firm cost from estimates of demand. In this case, I have average
cost data and instead use the first-order conditions to recover the partial derivative of
claims with respect to the premium, accounting for the likely presence of adverse selection
and moral hazard.
How valid is the equilibrium assumption? While volatility was quite high in many states
during the 2014 and 2015 plan years, empirical evidence suggests that the California and
Washington marketplaces were relatively stable. Table 8 indicates that firm participation
in county markets changed little between 2014 and 2015. Only one small insurer (Contra
Costa) entirely exited the California marketplace in 2015, while two insurers (Columbia and
Moda) entered the Washington marketplace in 2015. Through the 2017 plan year, all 2015
California marketplace participants remain. In Washington, all 2015 marketplace partici-
pants, except for Columbia and Moda, continue to offer coverage as of the 2017 plan year.
Table 9 also indicates that premium changes were modest between 2014 and 2015, rising
about 3 percent in California and falling by about 1 percent in Washington. Compared to
firms in other states, California and Washington firms were relatively robust, ranking in the
top ten in profitability each year as shown in Table 10.
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Table 8: Insurer County Participation in the California and Washington Exchanges
California Washington
2014 2015 2014 2015
Anthem Blue Cross 58 58
Blue Shield of California 54 58
BridgeSpan Health 7 12
Centene/Health Net 22 19 14 16
Chinese Community Health Plan 2 2
Columbia United Providers 0 1
Community Health Plan 26 26
Contra Costa Health Plan 1 0
Kaiser Permanente/Group Health 31 31 21 21
L.A. Care Health Plan 1 1
Moda Health 0 39
Molina Healthcare 4 4 3 7
Premera Blue Cross/Lifewise 39 39
Sharp Health Care 1 1
Valley Health Plan 1 1
Western Health Advantage 8 8
Notes: Table shows the number of counties that each California and Washington insurer participated in.
There are 58 counties in California and 39 counties in Washington. Centene, Kaiser, and Molina
participate in both states.
Table 9: Insurers, Plans, and Premiums by State and Year
California Washington
2014 2015 2014 2015
Insurers Available
Minimum 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
Median 5.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
Average 4.8 4.7 5.5 6.8
Maximum 6.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Plans Available
Minimum 5.0 10.0 16.0 21.0
Median 25.0 25.0 28.0 47.0
Average 24.6 24.5 26.2 45.8
Maximum 35.0 35.0 31.0 61.0
Silver Plan Premiums
County Average $309.70 $320.25 $306.00 $303.46
Minimum $221.56 $230.31 $234.72 $218.55
Maximum $480.59 $554.26 $369.11 $363.24
Minimum second-lowest $253.27 $257.19 $260.01 $252.67
Maximum second-lowest $422.58 $423.67 $312.61 $297.00
NOTES: The first two panels provide summary statistics on the number of insurers and plans available to
consumers. The third panel shows variation in silver plan premiums for a 40-year old nonsmoker.
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Table 10: PMPM Profitability of Individual Market Insurers by State
2014 2015
State Rank
Profit
PMPM
State Rank
Profit
PMPM
1) Washington $17.86 1) North Dakota $10.09
2) California $11.10 2) Rhode Island $6.23
3) New Jersey $8.92 3) Iowa $3.13
4) Vermont $7.92 4) Massachusetts ($5.87)
5) Indiana $4.52 5) New Jersey ($5.93)
6) Rhode Island $1.74 6) California ($10.12)
7) New Hampshire $0.57 7) Connecticut ($18.00)
8) North Dakota ($1.15) 8) Washington ($22.52)
9) Connecticut ($6.10) 9) Missouri ($30.51)
10) Massachusetts ($8.62) 10) Vermont ($31.14)
...
...
42) Texas ($58.55) 42) Oregon ($89.92)
43) Arkansas ($58.58) 43) Utah ($94.61)
44) Utah ($59.38) 44) Arizona ($98.30)
45) Arizona ($61.05) 45) Arkansas ($100.56)
46) Oklahoma ($61.88) 46) Oklahoma ($101.07)
47) Pennsylvania ($72.49) 47) Wisconsin ($104.16)
48) Alaska ($74.37) 48) Idaho ($108.54)
49) District of Columbia ($77.28) 49) Montana ($110.87)
50) Montana ($81.44) 50) South Dakota ($126.55)
51) Nebraska ($81.54) 51) Alaska ($157.69)
Notes: Table shows the per-member per-month profit (loss) earned by insurers in each state ranking in the
top ten and bottom ten profitability. The profit measure includes premiums collected, incurred claims,
administrative costs, risk adjustment payments or receipts, reinsurance recoveries, risk corridor payments
or receipts, medical loss ratio (MLR) rebates, and taxes and fees.
47
CHAPTER 7 : Demand and Claims Estimates
7.1. Demand Estimates
This section summarizes my estimates of demand in the ACA exchanges. Estimates of
the parameters in utility equation (6.2) are in Appendix E. I interpret these estimates
by computing premium elasticities and semi-elasticities of demand. Appendix F presents
formulas for computing elasticities and semi-elasticities in the ACA setting.
Table 11 summarizes the mean own-premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand by
demographic group for California and Washington. The mean own-premium elasticity of
demand is the percentage change in a plan’s enrollment associated with a one percent
increase in its base premium. The mean own-premium semi-elasticity of demand is the
percentage change in a plan’s enrollment associated with a $100 increase in its annual
premium. California consumers have a mean own-premium elasticity of −7.8 and mean
own-premium semi-elasticity of −19.8. Washington consumers have a mean own-premium
elasticity of −6.9 and mean own-premium semi-elasticity of −23.9. Variation in premium
sensitivity across demographic groups is consistent with theory. In particular, low-income
individuals, males, and young adults between the ages of 18 and 34 are more premium
sensitive.
Table 12 presents estimated premium elasticities and semi-elasticities for exchange cover-
age. The premium elasticity for exchange coverage is the percentage change in exchange
enrollment associated with a one percent increase in the base premium of all exchange plans.
The premium semi-elasticity for exchange coverage is the percentage change in exchange
enrollment associated with a $100 annual increase in all exchange premiums. California
consumers have an elasticity for exchange coverage of −0.6 and a semi-elasticity for ex-
change coverage of −1.8. Washington consumers have an elasticity for exchange coverage
of −0.5 and a semi-elasticity for exchange coverage of −2.0. Variation in premium sensi-
tivity across demographic groups is similar to the variation in the own-premium elasticity
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Table 11: Estimated Mean Own-Premium Elasticities
California Washington
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Overall -7.8 -19.8 -6.9 -23.9
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -9.7 -24.5 -15.2 -51.3
138-250 -8.4 -21.1 -6.5 -22.4
250-400 -6.8 -17.3 -5.9 -20.3
400+ -6.8 -17.2 -5.7 -19.6
Gender
Female -6.8 -17.2 -6.6 -23.2
Male -8.1 -20.5 -7.1 -24.8
Age
18-34 -9.5 -22.9 -8.8 -28.7
35-54 -8.8 -21.3 -7.1 -23.1
55+ -5.9 -14.1 -5.2 -16.9
Smoking Status
Smoker -8.2 -28.4
Non-Smoker -6.6 -23.1
Race
Asian -7.4 -25.8
Black -11.1 -37.8
White -6.5 -22.7
Household Size
Single -11.4 -29.2 -9.2 -32.5
Family -5.7 -15.0 -5.8 -21.3
Mandate Status
Exempt -6.1 -15.6 -6.0 -20.9
Subject -7.9 -20.1 -6.9 -24.1
Year
2014 -7.7 -19.6 -7.4 -25.8
2015 -7.9 -20.0 -6.6 -23.2
Notes: Table shows mean own-premium elasticities and semi-elasticities by demographic group. A plan’s
own-premium elasticity indicates the percentage change in enrollment for a 1 percent increase in its
premium and is computed using equation (A.11). A plan’s own-premium semi-elasticity indicates the
percentage change in enrollment for a $100 increase in its annual premium and is computed using equation
(A.12). I use the plan market shares as weights to compute the mean elasticities and semi-elasticities.
estimates across demographic groups.
I conduct two sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of my findings. First, I run
additional regressions where I include indicators for the cheapest plan and cheapest silver
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Table 12: Estimated Elasticities and Semi-Elasticities for Exchange Coverage
California Washington
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Elasticity
Semi-
Elasticity
Overall -0.6 -1.8 -0.5 -2.0
Income (% of FPL)
0-138 -0.7 -2.2 -1.2 -4.4
138-250 -0.6 -1.9 -0.6 -2.0
250-400 -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -1.9
400+ -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -1.8
Gender
Female -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -1.9
Male -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 -2.1
Age
18-34 -0.7 -2.0 -0.7 -2.4
35-54 -0.6 -1.9 -0.5 -1.9
55+ -0.4 -1.3 -0.4 -1.4
Smoking Status
Smoker -0.6 -2.1
Non-Smoker -0.5 -1.7
Race
Asian -0.6 -2.0
Black -0.8 -2.8
White -0.5 -1.7
Household Size
Single -0.7 -2.4 -0.7 -2.6
Family -0.4 -1.2 -0.4 -1.7
Mandate Status
Exempt -0.4 -1.2 -0.5 -1.7
Subject -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -2.0
Year
2014 -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 -2.1
2015 -0.6 -1.8 -0.5 -1.9
Notes: Table shows mean elasticities and semi-elasticities for exchange coverage by demographic group.
The mean elasticity for exchange coverage indicates the percentage change in exchange enrollment if all
exchange premiums increase by 1 percent and is computed using equation (A.13). The mean
semi-elasticity for exchange coverage indicates the percentage change in exchange enrollment if all annual
exchange premiums increase by $100 and is computed using equation (A.14). I use the plan market shares
as weights to compute the mean elasticities and semi-elasticities.
plan in each household’s choice set. These tests assess whether consumers gravitate to the
cheapest plans. Table 25 shows both cheapest plan indicators are positive and statistically
significant, but the coefficient for the cheapest silver plan is substantially larger. This result
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suggests that CSR-eligible consumers strategically select the cheapest plan eligible for CSRs.
Second, I account for the possibility of inertia by incorporating an indicator in the vector
di for a household renewing exchange coverage in 2015. Table 25 in Appendix E indicates
that the results are robust to the inclusion of the renewal indicator.
Table 13 displays the estimated non-premium plan characteristics parameters of utility
equation (4.1). The actuarial value of the plan has a strong positive impact on household
plan selection in both states. Consumers may view the metal tier of the plan as a convenient
signal for plan quality that involves little search effort. The effect of the plan actuarial value
is substantially greater in California than in Washington. Plan standardization may make
the actuarial value a more prominent plan attribute for California consumers. Coefficients
for the other plan characteristics are far smaller in magnitude, suggesting that the plan metal
tier represents the critical non-premium plan characteristic in consumer decision-making.
7.2. Claims Estimates
Table 14 shows estimates of the parameters b1 and b2 in average claims function (6.4)
for the California exchange. The estimates are similar for both ordinary least squares
and two-stage least squares. Only the coefficients for the base premium and the actuarial
value are statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for the base premium and
the actuarial value have an intuitive interpretation that decomposes the effects of adverse
selection and moral hazard on the claim slope. In particular, the coefficient b1 measures how
the claim slope responds to premiums, given the plan actuarial value and any associated
moral hazard. The positive value of b1 indicates that selection worsens as the premium
increases. Conversely, the negative coefficient on the actuarial value coefficient indicates
that more generous plans have a lower claim slope, controlling for selection by holding the
base premium fixed. A small increase in the premium of a more generous plan is likely to
incentivize consumers to substitute to a less generous plan under which they consume less,
reducing average claims. Overall, the model predictor variables explain about half of the
variation in the claim slope.
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Table 13: Estimated Parameters of Non-Premium Plan Characteristics
California Washington
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗
(0.715) (0.642)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗
(0.037) (0.131)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗
(0.022)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011
(0.014)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗
(0.078)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗
(0.092)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗
(0.045)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.083) (0.018)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗
(0.083)
CHPW 0.207∗∗
(0.087)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.142) (0.044)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗
(0.028)
Moda 0.151∗∗
(0.071)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗
(0.042)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗
(0.166)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗
(0.083)
Valley −0.003
(0.012)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗
(0.039)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Table shows parameter estimates for the non-premium plan characteristics. Robust standard
errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge (2010)).
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Table 14: Predicting the Claim Slope (∂cf (p)/∂pf ) in California
Ordinary Least
Squares
Instrumental
Variables
Base Premium 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Actuarial Value −7.685∗∗∗ −6.910∗∗∗
(0.754) (1.175)
HMO −0.002 0.022
(0.087) (0.087)
HSA 0.299 0.307
(0.190) (0.193)
Observations 149 149
R2 0.494 0.488
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.474
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Table shows parameter estimates for the linear
regression of the claim slope on the premium and plan characteristics in the California exchange. Each
observation is a plan-year combination.
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CHAPTER 8 : Impact of the Individual Mandate
In this chapter, I present my principal findings on the impact of the individual mandate
for purchasing insurance. First, I examine how consumers respond to the ACA’s individual
mandate in the California and Washington ACA exchanges. I then simulate the impact of
the individual mandate on premiums, insurance coverage, and social welfare in the California
ACA exchange.
8.1. Consumer Response to the Individual Mandate
I examine how consumers respond to the individual along two dimensions. First, I assess
whether the individual mandate elicits a behavioral response from consumers. Second, I
determine whether consumers who enrolled just before the mandate took effect are more
sensitive to premiums.
In Table 15, I compare three alternative specifications of utility equation (4.1): (1) in-
cluding the mandate intercept dmi in the vector of demographic variables, (2) relaxing the
rationality assumption that the premium and penalty variable parameters are equal and
(3) including a mandate intercept and modeling the premium and penalty variables with
different coefficients. Table 15 presents estimates of the individual mandate parameters for
these specifications. I find that the mandate compliance variable is positive and statistically
significant across the specifications, indicating that consumers may have a taste for com-
pliance with the individual mandate. In contrast, the coefficient on the penalty amount in
sensitivity runs is either statistically insignificant or has the wrong (positive) sign, similar
to what Frean et al. (2017) find.
The estimates imply that the taste for compliance in Washington is $67 per month using
equation (4.6). The estimated taste for compliance is considerably higher in California, but
my sensitivity analyses indicate that lack of data on smokers could be a source of upward
bias. The taste for compliance estimates could be subject to omitted variable bias due to
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lack of data on health status. Table 15 also suggests the presence of potential collinearity
between the penalty and income.
Table 15: Estimated Individual Mandate Parameters
Mandate
Intercept
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
California
Penalty 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.122) (0.155)
Mandate × > 400% −0.911∗∗∗
(0.212)
Washington
Penalty 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
Mandate 0.181∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076) (0.109) (0.061)
Mandate × > 400% −1.500∗∗∗
(0.161)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses
(see p.503 of Wooldridge (2010)). Table shows parameter estimates for the individual mandate sensitivity
runs. Column 1 includes a mandate intercept, column 2 includes a separate penalty parameter, and
column 3 includes both a mandate intercept and separate penalty parameter. Column 4 adds an
interaction between the mandate intercept and an intercept for those earning above 400 percent of FPL,
while column 5 excludes the smoker variables in the Washington analysis.
It is also possible that cognitive difficulty in understanding the complex details of the ACA’s
individual mandate, not a taste for compliance, may explain the statistically significant
response to the existence of the penalty rather than the amount of the penalty. I design a test
to assess this explanation that distinguishes between the two primary mandate exemptions:
(1) the household has income below the filing threshold and (2) the household lacks an
affordable offer. Ascertaining whether an offer is affordable is a complex cognitive task,
whereas determining whether income is below the filing threshold is a more straightforward
exercise that long pre-dates the ACA. I distinguish between these two mandate exemptions
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by adding an interaction of the mandate intercept and the intercept for income above 400
percent of FPL to utility equation (4.1), as nearly all households with an affordable offer
exemption have income just above the 400 percent of FPL threshold for receiving subsidies.
The fifth column of Table 15 indicates that individuals with income above 400 percent of
FPL are not sensitive to the existence of the mandate, compared to those with income below
400 percent of FPL. Therefore, those who have a greater challenge in determining their
exemption status are less responsive to the penalty’s existence, indicating that cognitive
difficulty does not drive the sensitivity of consumers to the penalty’s existence.
I also assess whether consumers who enrolled just before the mandate took effect are more
sensitive to premiums using data from Washington state. Consumers had to have coverage
effective May 1, 2014 in order to comply with the mandate, but were allowed to begin
exchange coverage as early as January 1, 2014. Table 16 provides summary statistics com-
paring early enrollees to late enrollees. Late enrollees are less likely to choose a gold or
platinum plan and more likely to select a bronze plan. I also find that late enrollees are
more likely to be young adults, male, and racial minorities. Table 17 indicates that late
enrollees are more premium elastic. Consumers beginning coverage in January 2014 had a
mean own-premium elasticity of −6.1, while, those beginning coverage in May 2014 had a
mean own-premium elasticity of −7.3. Premium sensitivity is also monotonically increasing
in the coverage start date. These findings suggest that the mandate incentivizes lower-risk
individuals to enroll, reducing adverse selection. In contrast, Table 17 indicates a substan-
tially smaller increase in consumer premium sensitivity during the course of the 2015 open
enrollment period when the mandate had already been in effect for a year.
8.2. Impact on Premiums
Table 18 reports the impact of the individual mandate on average unsubsidized premiums
in the California exchange for a 40-year old nonsmoker by metal tier. Overall, the premium
impacts of the individual mandate are modest. Repealing the individual mandate would
increase bronze plan premiums by about 4 percent, while platinum plan premiums would
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Table 16: Choice and Demographic Distribution by Coverage Start Date (WAHBE)
Jan. 2014 Feb. 2014 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014
Metal Tier Choice
Catastrophic 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Bronze 32.5% 40.1% 40.8% 36.9% 41.7%
Silver 57.3% 50.3% 51.4% 56.5% 52.9%
Gold 10.1% 9.6% 7.8% 6.5% 5.2%
Platinum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Network Type Choice
HMO 31.6% 34.5% 38.0% 41.1% 41.4%
PPO 68.4% 65.5% 62.0% 58.9% 58.6%
Income
0% to 138% of FPL 3.6% 6.8% 7.0% 6.4% 4.6%
138% to 150% of FPL 7.8% 9.4% 10.2% 9.3% 8.2%
150% to 200% of FPL 27.0% 30.8% 33.1% 33.2% 32.7%
200% to 250% of FPL 17.5% 18.0% 18.3% 18.6% 19.3%
250% to 400% of FPL 27.2% 23.4% 21.9% 22.4% 22.2%
400%+ of FPL 16.9% 11.6% 9.5% 10.1% 13.0%
Subsidy Eligibility
Premium tax credits 82.1% 87.6% 89.8% 89.4% 86.2%
Cost sharing reduction subsidies 55.3% 64.4% 68.2% 67.2% 64.3%
Penalty Status
Exempt 6.8% 5.8% 5.1% 4.8% 3.9%
Subject 93.2% 94.2% 94.9% 95.2% 96.1%
Age
0-17 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
18-25 7.5% 10.5% 9.8% 9.6% 9.5%
26-34 13.3% 16.8% 18.3% 19.1% 23.4%
35-44 15.2% 17.8% 18.3% 18.6% 20.2%
45-54 21.9% 23.2% 24.0% 24.0% 23.4%
55-64 41.4% 30.6% 28.8% 28.0% 23.0%
65+ 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5%
Gender
Female 55.7% 54.5% 55.0% 53.7% 49.7%
Male 44.3% 45.5% 45.0% 46.3% 50.3%
Race
Asian 11.4% 16.8% 19.9% 18.8% 14.1%
Black/African American 1.9% 2.8% 3.6% 4.1% 4.7%
Other Race 3.5% 5.7% 6.5% 6.6% 7.1%
White 83.2% 74.7% 70.0% 70.5% 74.0%
Smoking Status
Non-Smoker 92.6% 91.3% 90.6% 89.9% 88.8%
Smoker 7.4% 8.7% 9.4% 10.1% 11.2%
Total population 54,664 24,260 17,536 24,652 27,678
Notes: Table compares Washington exchange enrollee choices and demographic characteristics by their
coverage initiation dates.
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Table 17: Estimated Mean Own-Premium Elasticities by Coverage Start Date (Washington)
Coverage Start Month Elasticity Semi-Elasticity
January 2014 -6.1 -21.5
February 2014 -6.7 -23.5
March 2014 -6.9 -24.1
April 2014 -7.0 -24.3
May 2014 -7.3 -25.5
January 2015 -6.0 -20.9
February 2015 -6.3 -22.2
March 2015 -6.5 -22.8
Notes: Table shows mean own-premium elasticities and semi-elasticities for Washington exchange
consumers by coverage initiation month. A plan’s own-premium elasticity indicates the percentage change
in enrollment for a 1 percent increase in its premium and is computed using equation (A.11). A plan’s
own-premium semi-elasticity indicates the percentage change in enrollment for a $100 increase in its annual
premium and is computed using equation (A.12).
decline by 1.7 percent. Silver and gold plan premiums would also increase modestly if the
mandate were repealed.
My estimates of how repealing the individual mandate would affect premiums are smaller
than those in the ACA microsimulation literature.1 Microsimulation models generally pre-
dict that mandate repeal would increase premiums by roughly 10 to 25 percent (Eibner and
Price, 2012). Most recently, the Congressional Budget Office estimated individual market
premiums would rise by 10 percent if the individual mandate were repealed (Congressional
Budget Office, 2017). A plausible reason for the discrepancy is that microsimulation models
typically do not consider insurer market power and generally assume perfect competition or
a constant markup above marginal cost. Although repealing the individual mandate is likely
to worsen the exchange risk pool, competitive forces may limit the extent to which firms can
adjust premiums to reflect changes in risk. In state exchanges with less robust competition
than the California exchange, it is possible that repealing the individual mandate would
lead to larger premium increases.
1These include analyses by the Congressional Budget Office, Lewin Group, RAND Corporation, Urban
Institute, and Jonathan Gruber.
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Table 18: Effect of the Individual Mandate on (Pre-Subsidy) Premiums
No Individual Mandate
Individual Mandate ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Catastrophic $195 $192 $194
Bronze $221 $229 $226
Silver $273 $276 $278
Gold $315 $326 $322
Platinum $353 $347 $354
Notes: Table shows the impact of the individual mandate on weighted-average premiums by metal tier for
a 40-year old non-smoker in California. Plan premiums are weighted by the realized ACA plan market
share for all simulated scenarios. The first column presents the observed premiums with the mandate in
effect. The second column presents simulated premiums without the individual mandate and ACA
price-linked subsidies in place. The third column presents simulated premiums without the individual
mandate when vouchers replace ACA price-linked subsidies. The household’s voucher is set equal to the
subsidy the household receives under the ACA with the mandate in effect.
8.3. Impact on Insurance Coverage
Table 19 shows how the individual mandate affects insurance coverage. Repealing the indi-
vidual mandate would have two main insurance coverage impacts: (1) a 19 percent decline
in total exchange coverage and (2) substantial declines in bronze and silver plan enrollment,
but a relatively small decline in gold plan enrollment and an increase in platinum plan en-
rollment. These results illustrate the tradeoff in addressing the intensive and extensive
margin effects of adverse selection. The individual mandate encourages low-risk consumers
to enroll, improving the exchange risk pool. However, these low-risk consumers gravitate
to the less generous bronze and silver plans, leading to greater premium differentials be-
tween bronze and platinum plans. Some platinum plan enrollees shift to less generous plans,
resulting in underinsurance.
8.4. Impact on Per-Capita Social Welfare
In Table 20, I report the impact of the individual mandate on per-capita social welfare.
Total social welfare includes consumer surplus, firm profit, and government spending. Gov-
ernment spending accounts for premium subsidies, cost sharing reductions, mandate penalty
revenue, and uncompensated care. To calculate per-capita amounts, I divide all total dollar
amounts by the total number of consumers in the market, including those choosing the
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Table 19: Effect of the Individual Mandate on Insurance Coverage
No Individual Mandate
Individual Mandate ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Catastrophic 9,174 5,381 5,725
Bronze 314,528 119,282 154,294
Silver 850,537 767,822 715,213
Gold 72,079 66,661 62,844
Platinum 64,216 97,583 86,695
Total 1,310,535 1,056,729 1,024,772
Notes: Table shows the impact of the individual mandate on insurance coverage by metal tier in California.
The first column presents the observed coverage distribution with the mandate in effect. The second
column presents the simulated coverage distribution without the individual mandate and ACA price-linked
subsidies in place. The third column presents the simulated coverage distribution without the individual
mandate when vouchers replace ACA price-linked subsidies. The household’s voucher is set equal to the
subsidy the household receives under the ACA with the mandate in effect.
outside option.
Repealing the individual mandate would increase consumer surplus by about $150 per con-
sumer per year or 2.6 percent. Consumer surplus gains are the result of increased takeup of
more generous platinum plans and not compelling some consumers to purchase insurance
against their will. The ACA’s price-linked subsidies also shield consumers from the premium
increases associated with repealing the mandate. Repealing the individual mandate slightly
increases government spending. Although subsidy spending declines because of lower ex-
change enrollment, the government forgoes revenue from the individual mandate penalty
and faces increased costs in covering the care of the uninsured. Overall, the individual
mandate has minimal net impact on social welfare.
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Table 20: Effect of the Individual Mandate on Per-Capita Social Welfare
No Individual Mandate
Individual
Mandate
ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Consumer Surplus $5,231 $5,373 $4,909
Profit -$94 -$131 $40
Government Spending
Premium Subsidies -$1,511 -$1,251 -$1,088
CSRs -$131 -$121 -$103
Mandate Revenue $192 $0 $0
Uncompensated Care -$1,002 -$1,198 -$1,226
Social Welfare $2,685 $2,672 $2,532
Notes: Table shows the impact of the individual mandate on annual per-capita social welfare in California.
The first column presents the welfare distribution with the mandate in effect. The second column presents
the simulated welfare distribution without the individual mandate and ACA price-linked subsidies in place.
The third column presents the simulated welfare distribution without the individual mandate when
vouchers replace ACA price-linked subsidies. The household’s voucher is set equal to the subsidy the
household receives under the ACA with the mandate in effect. The calculations for consumer surplus,
profit, premium subsidies, cost sharing subsidies, individual mandate revenue are endogenous to the model.
I calculate uncompensated care by multiplying the number of uninsured that I estimate by (1) the
per-capita amount of medical costs that are paid on behalf of the nonelderly uninsured as estimated by
Coughlin et al. (2014) and (2) an inflation factor using data from the National Health Expenditure
Accounts to adjust the estimates to the timeframe of this study (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2018).
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CHAPTER 9 : Impact of Risk Adjustment
This chapter presents my principal findings on the welfare impact of risk adjustment (rela-
tive to no risk adjustment) in the ACA exchanges. I present (1) descriptive evidence of the
important correlations identified in the theoretical analysis of the model and (2) simulation
results of the impact of risk adjustment on premiums, coverage, and social welfare.
9.1. Evidence of Correlations Identified in Model Analysis
Examining the key correlations identified in the model analysis provides useful insight into
the possible welfare impact of risk adjustment in the ACA exchanges. My analysis of
the model suggests that risk adjustment is likely to compress premiums if premiums and
consumer risk are positively correlated. Figure 9 indicates that there is strong positive cor-
relation between premiums and marginal claims in the California exchange. Implementation
of risk adjustment is therefore likely to compress equilibrium premiums, making cheaper
plans more expensive and more expensive plans cheaper. Premium compression may lead
to the loss of low-risk consumers from the risk pool if adverse selection and firm cost are
negatively correlated. To assess whether there is negative correlation between adverse se-
lection and firm cost, I plot the slope of the marginal claims curve against marginal claims
in Figure 10. The slight negative correlation between the marginal claims curve slope and
marginal claims in Figure 10 suggests that adverse selection and firm cost are negatively
correlated. Some low-risk consumers may therefore forgo exchange coverage as a result of
cheaper plans becoming more expensive.
9.2. Impact on Premiums
Table 21 reports the impact of risk adjustment on average premiums for a 40 year-old
nonsmoker by metal tier and by insurer. The ACA risk adjustment program (column 2)
compresses equilibrium premiums relative to the case without risk adjustment (column 1).
Specifically, risk adjustment leads to reductions in platinum and gold premiums by 25 and
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Figure 9: Scatter Plot of Premiums vs. Marginal Claims
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Notes: Figure plots the premium for a 40-year old nonsmoker against marginal claims for every plan
offered in the California exchange for the 2014 and 2015 plan years in the absence of risk adjustment. The
positive correlation between premiums and marginal cost suggests that risk adjustment is likely to
compress premiums.
15 percent, respectively, and increases in bronze and silver premiums by 11 and 2 percent,
respectively. Premium compression also occurs across insurers within metal tiers. The
second panel of Table 21 indicates that risk adjustment reduces silver premiums for insurers
such as Sharp Health Care and Western Health Advantage that have the highest premiums
in the absence of risk adjustment. Conversely, premiums rise for insurers such as Chinese
Community Health Plan, Health Net, L.A. Care Health Plan, and Molina Healthcare that
have the lowest premiums without risk adjustment.
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Figure 10: Scatter Plot of the Marginal Claims Curve Slope vs. Marginal Claims
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Notes: Figure plots the slope of the marginal claims curve against marginal claims for every plan offered in
the California exchange for the 2014 and 2015 plan years in the absence of risk adjustment. The negative
correlation between adverse selection and firm cost suggests that premium compression may result in some
low-risk consumers exiting the exchange.
9.3. Impact on Insurance Coverage
Table 22 shows how risk adjustment affects insurance coverage. The total number of con-
sumers who purchase insurance remains about the same, but the distribution of consumers
across the metal tiers shifts. Higher pre-subsidy premiums for bronze and silver plans result
in relatively modest enrollment declines in the bronze and silver tiers. Because most con-
sumers receive subsidies that adjust to the benchmark second-lowest cost silver premium, the
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Table 21: Effect of Risk Adjustment on (Pre-Subsidy) Premiums
Risk Adjustment
No Risk
Adjustment
ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Metal
Bronze $198 $221 $218
Silver $267 $273 $269
Gold $367 $315 $310
Platinum $474 $353 $346
Insurer (Silver Premium)
Anthem BC $271 $291 $284
Blue Shield $279 $262 $261
Chinese Community $268 $342 $354
Contra Costa $334 $355 $367
Health Net $222 $233 $229
Kaiser $286 $292 $288
LA Care $238 $259 $247
Molina $247 $261 $262
Sharp $380 $324 $332
Valley $286 $353 $350
Western $412 $396 $391
Notes: Table shows the impact of risk adjustment on weighted-average premiums by metal tier and by
insurer for a 40-year old non-smoker in California. Plan premiums are weighted by the realized ACA plan
market share for all simulated scenarios. The first column presents simulated premiums without risk
adjustment. The second column presents observed premiums with risk adjustment when ACA risk
adjustment formula (A.8) is used. The third column presents simulated premiums with risk adjustment
when ACA risk adjustment formula (A.8) is used and vouchers replace ACA price-linked subsidies. The
household’s voucher is set equal to the subsidy each household would receive under the ACA without risk
adjustment.
increased cost of bronze and silver plans is largely borne by taxpayers in the form of larger
subsidy payments rather than by consumers. In contrast, enrollment in subsidy-ineligible
catastrophic plans declines more precipitously. Larger subsidies and lower pre-subsidy pre-
miums for platinum plans encourage robust enrollment in the platinum tier; the share of
enrollees choosing platinum rises from 2 percent to nearly 5 percent.
9.4. Impact on Per-Capita Social Welfare
In Table 23, I report the impact of risk adjustment on per-capita social welfare. Changes in
total social welfare are relatively small, but risk adjustment alters the welfare distribution.
In particular, risk adjustment increases consumer surplus by about $200 per consumer per
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Table 22: Effect of Risk Adjustment on Insurance Coverage
Risk Adjustment
No Risk Adjustment ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Catastrophic 2.0% 0.7% 0.7%
Bronze 24.5% 24.0% 23.8%
Silver 66.1% 64.9% 64.0%
Gold 5.3% 5.5% 5.9%
Platinum 2.0% 4.9% 5.6%
Total Coverage 1,316,258 1,310,535 1,280,594
Notes: Table shows the impact of risk adjustment on insurance coverage by metal tier in California. The
first column presents the simulated insurance coverage distribution without risk adjustment. The second
column presents the observed insurance coverage distribution with risk adjustment when ACA risk
adjustment formula (A.8) is used. The third column presents the simulated insurance coverage distribution
with risk adjustment when ACA risk adjustment formula (A.8) is used and vouchers replace ACA
price-linked subsidies. The household’s voucher is set equal to the subsidy each household would receive
under the ACA without risk adjustment.
year. The increase in consumer surplus is due to (1) the decline in premiums for the more
generous gold and platinum plans and (2) the maintenance of after-subsidy premiums for
the less generous bronze and silver plans despite increases in pre-subsidy bronze and silver
premiums. Maintaining what consumers pay for the less generous bronze and silver plans
requires considerable financing of premium subsidies. Premium subsidy spending increases
by more than $200 per consumer per year, offsetting the gains in consumer surplus. Hence,
risk adjustment coupled with price-linked subsidies has the effect of transferring welfare from
taxpayers to consumers. Changes in other sources of government spending are negligible.
Declines in firm profits are relatively small.
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Table 23: Effect of Risk Adjustment on Annual Per-Capita Social Welfare
Risk Adjustment
No Risk
Adjustment
ACA Subsidies Vouchers
Consumer Surplus $5,035 $5,231 $4,826
Profit -$2 -$94 -$234
Government Spending
Premium Subsidies -$1,288 -$1,511 -$1,277
CSRs -$122 -$131 -$130
Mandate Revenue $188 $192 $195
Social Welfare $3,812 $3,687 $3,380
Notes: Table shows the impact of risk adjustment on annual per-capita social welfare in California. The
first column presents the simulated welfare distribution without risk adjustment. The second column
presents the welfare distribution with risk adjustment when ACA risk adjustment formula (A.8) is used.
The third column presents the simulated welfare distribution with risk adjustment when ACA risk
adjustment formula (A.8) is used and vouchers replace ACA price-linked subsidies. The household’s
voucher is set equal to the subsidy each household would receive under the ACA without risk adjustment.
The calculations for consumer surplus, profit, premium subsidies, cost sharing subsidies, individual
mandate revenue are endogenous to the model. I calculate uncompensated care by multiplying the number
of uninsured that I estimate by (1) the per-capita amount of medical costs that are paid on behalf of the
nonelderly uninsured as estimated by Coughlin et al. (2014) and (2) an inflation factor using data from the
National Health Expenditure Accounts to adjust the estimates to the timeframe of this study (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).
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CHAPTER 10 : Impact of the Subsidy Design
Another important policy that targets adverse selection is the premium subsidy design.
Recent work has compared the welfare impact of price-linked subsidies with the welfare
impact of fixed subsidies or vouchers (Jaffe and Shepard, 2017; Tebaldi, 2017). In this
chapter, I extend this literature by investigating how the subsidy design interacts with the
individual mandate and risk adjustment.
10.1. Interaction Between the Individual Mandate and the Subsidy Design
The amount of the ACA’s price-linked subsidies can change under the individual mandate
because the mandate affects premiums. I now simulate the impact of the individual mandate
when the ACA’s price-linked subsidies are replaced with fixed subsidies or vouchers which
do not adjust to premium changes. I set the voucher amount equal to the subsidy that a
consumer receives under the ACA with the individual mandate in place.
Table 18 reports the impact of the individual mandate on unsubsidized premiums by metal
tier for a 40 year-old nonsmoker in California. Without an individual mandate, platinum
plan premiums would be about 2 percent higher under vouchers, while bronze plan premiums
would be about 1 percent lower. Overall, the effect of repealing the mandate on premiums
is not particularly sensitive to the subsidy design.
In Table 19, I show how these premium changes affect insurance coverage by metal tier.
Repealing the individual mandate under vouchers leads to a 22 percent reduction in to-
tal exchange coverage, compared to a 19 percent reduction under the ACA’s price linked
subsidies. Although repealing the individual mandate has similar premium impacts under
both subsidy designs, consumers are only exposed to the adverse premium changes under
vouchers, resulting in a larger decline in total coverage. Without the mandate, enrollment
in platinum plans is considerably lower when vouchers are in place, while enrollment in
bronze plans is higher. This result suggests that consumer sorting across plans may be
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sub-optimal under vouchers.
Table 20 indicates that the subsidy design affects the consumer welfare impact of the in-
dividual mandate. Repealing the individual mandate reduces annual per-capita consumer
surplus by about 6 percent under vouchers, but increases consumer surplus by about 3
percent under ACA subsidies. In contrast to the ACA’s price-linked subsidies, vouchers
expose consumers to the premium increases resulting from mandate repeal, leading to the
negative impact on consumer surplus. However, vouchers decrease government spending by
reducing subsidy outlays. Although the subsidy design affects the welfare distribution, the
overall welfare impact is not particularly sensitive to the subsidy design.
10.2. Interaction Between Risk Adjustment and the Subsidy Design
Because risk adjustment affects premiums (including the benchmark premium), the amount
of the ACA’s price-linked subsidies can change under risk adjustment. I now simulate the
effect of risk adjustment when the ACA’s price-linked subsidies are replaced with fixed
subsidies or vouchers which do not adjust to premium changes. I set the voucher amount
equal to the ACA subsidy that a consumer would have received in the absence of risk
adjustment.
Table 21 reports the impact on premiums for a 40 year-old non-smoker. For the most part,
the results for vouchers are very similar to the results for ACA subsidies. Premiums for less
generous bronze and silver plans rise, while premiums for more generous gold and platinum
plans fall. The impact on premiums across insurers is similar as well.
In contrast, the replacement of ACA subsidies with vouchers does impact insurance cov-
erage. Although risk adjustment increases bronze and silver (pre-subsidy) premiums by
roughly the same amount under both subsidy schemes, consumers are only exposed to the
increases in the voucher scenario. Consequently, insurance coverage falls by 35, 000 under
risk adjustment, as reported in Table 22. As before, risk adjustment changes the distribu-
tion of enrollment across the metal tiers. Enrollment in the less generous bronze and silver
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plans declines, while enrollment in more generous gold and platinum plans increases.
Table 23 reports the impact of risk adjustment on annual per-capita social welfare when
vouchers replace ACA subsidies. In this case, risk adjustment reduces per-capita social
welfare by $432 per year from $3, 812 to $3, 380. The most significant difference is the
drop in consumer surplus of about $200 per year, instead of an increase of about $200 per
year when ACA subsidies were in place. Taxpayer outlays are largely unchanged. Hence,
vouchers shift the burden of the premium increase due to risk adjustment from taxpayers
back to consumers. Importantly, consumer surplus falls by more than the government saves
in premium subsidy outlays, explaining most of the decrease in total social welfare. The
loss of highly-profitable low-risk consumers reduces firm profit.
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CHAPTER 11 : Conclusion
Managing the effects of adverse selection in health insurance is a key challenge in the design
of efficient health insurance markets. In this dissertation, I investigate the social welfare
impact of two policies – the individual mandate and risk adjustment – that target adverse
selection. I show that the social welfare impact of both policies is theoretically ambiguous
because of the tradeoff in addressing the intensive and extensive margin effects of adverse
selection. I then study the welfare impact of the individual mandate and risk adjustment
in the ACA exchanges. Repealing the mandate increases consumer surplus by 2.7 percent
because it improves consumer sorting across plans and the ACA’s price-linked subsidies
limit consumer exposure to higher bronze, silver, and gold plan premiums. Similarly, risk
adjustment increases consumer surplus by 3.9 percent by improving consumer sorting across
plans and shielding consumers from higher bronze and silver plan premiums. If consumers
are exposed to these premium increases under fixed subsidies or vouchers, mandate repeal
and risk adjustment decrease consumer surplus by 6.2 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively.
These results have several important policy implications. First, the individual mandate is
not a critical policy in the ACA exchanges because the ACA’s price-linked subsidies shield
consumers from premium increases that may result from mandate repeal. If the ACA’s
price-linked subsidies were converted to vouchers, the mandate would play a more important
role. Second, risk adjustment needs to be coupled with policies that limit the loss of low-risk
consumers when premiums rise to avoid negative welfare consequences. These policies may
include implicit price-linked subsidies that adjust to premium changes as implemented in
the ACA exchanges or explicit risk-based payments to insurers as implemented in Medicare
Advantage. Third, there is an important tradeoff in addressing the intensive and extensive
margin effects of adverse selection. Policies such as the individual mandate encourage low-
risk consumers to enroll in the market, but lead to underinsurance. In contrast, policies
such as risk adjustment address underinsurance, but can cause low-risk consumers to exit
the market.
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My analysis has several limitations. I assume that product characteristics such as plan
provider networks and formularies are exogenous. This assumption could be problematic
when studying risk adjustment because without risk adjustment, some firms may tailor
their provider networks and formularies to attract low-risk consumers. How the assump-
tion of exogenous product characteristics biases my results depends in part on the relative
magnitudes of intensive and extensive margin effects of adverse selection. Omitting inertia
in the model may upward bias my estimates of consumer premium elasticity, potentially
overstating the impact of risk adjustment. Inertia also has important consequences for
selection (Handel, 2013). In my model, I make some assumptions that could be problem-
atic in a new market, including (1) firms have perfect knowledge of their own and their
competitors’ claims functions and (2) the exchanges are in equilibrium. Several years or
more may be required for firms to learn about consumer preferences, enrollee utilization,
and strategic interactions with their competitors. Another issue concerns inversion of the
firms’ first-order conditions to estimate the claim slope. Inversion may fail or result in an
imprecise estimate or over-estimate of the claim slope if the sum of the efficiency score and
reinsurance factor is close to 1. Large estimates of the claim slope could magnify the impact
of premium changes.
There are several dimensions along which the analysis in this paper could be extended.
Adding a network formation stage to the model where providers and insurers bargain over
inclusion in the network would help to address the issues associated with assuming product
characteristics are exogenous. A dynamic framework that models how insurers learn over
time could also improve the accuracy of the welfare estimates. Another area for future
research is to evaluate alternative measures for addressing the tradeoff between adverse se-
lection and reclassification risk. Guaranteed renewable insurance policies with longer time
horizons that are not subject to community rating regulation could be a promising alter-
native (Pauly et al., 1995; Herring and Pauly, 2006). Adequately-funded high risk pools
that segregate the highest-risk consumers from the rest of the consumer population could
address the selection problem while protecting the sick and chronically ill from reclassifica-
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tion risk with taxpayer assistance. Particularly in an imperfectly competitive market, these
alternatives could help alleviate the negative welfare consequences of buttressing risk rating
regulations with policies such as the individual mandate and risk adjustment.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Model Example Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
1. First, I find the equilibrium premium vectors (p∗L, p
∗
H) and (p
R
L , p
R
H) for the example
where firms have the linear demand functions (4.10) and the linear average claims
functions (4.11). The Nash premium equilibrium is given by
p∗L =
2(κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)(1− λ2e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ1e2)(κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)
4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2)
p∗H =
2(κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)(1− λ1e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ2e2)(κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)
4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2)
For this equilibrium to be well-defined, I need two constraints on the parameters:
(a) Positive Demand
qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0 ⇔ a > κ [e1 − e2] (A.1)
(b) Positive Marginal Revenue
MRL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0
⇔ a < κ
[
4e1 − 4λ2e21 − 2λ1e1e2 − e22/e1 + 2λ2e22
4λ1e1 − 4λ1λ2e21 − 4λ1λ2e1e2 + 2λ1e2
]
(A.2)
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Putting constraints (A.1) and (A.2) together, it follows that the denominator D of
the equilibrium premiums p∗L and p
∗
H is strictly positive. That is,
e1 − e2 <
[
4e1 − 4λ2e21 − 2λ1e1e2 − e22/e1 + 2λ2e22
4λ1e1 − 4λ1λ2e21 − 4λ1λ2e1e2 + 2λ1e2
]
⇔ e1(4λ1 + 4λ2)− 4λ1λ2e21 + 4λ1λ2e22 < e22/e1(2λ1 + 2λ2) + 4− (e2/e1)2
⇔ 4(1− λ1e1 + λ2e1 + λ1λ2e21)− e22
(
1/e21 − 2λ1/e1 − 2λ2/e1 + 4λ1λ2
)
> 0
⇔ 4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2) > 0
⇔ D > 0
Let NL and NH be the numerators of p
∗
L and p
∗
H , respectively. Using constraint (A.1)
and the fact that D > 0, it follows that p∗L < p
∗
H because
p∗L < p
∗
H ⇔ NL < NH
⇔ 2(κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)(1− λ2e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ1e2)(κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)
< 2(κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)(1− λ1e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ2e2)(κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)
⇔ λ1((e1 − e2)κ− a) < λ2((e1 − e2)κ− a)
⇔ λ1 > λ2
Moreover, qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0 and MRH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > MRL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0. Be-
cause marginal revenue and marginal claims are equal at equilibrium, MCH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) >
MCL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0.
Implementation of risk adjustment eliminates firm L’s cost advantage such that both
firms have the same average claims function. Because both demand and claims are
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now symmetric, the firms set the same premium pR ≡ pRL = pRH and insure q(pR, pR)
consumers at equilibrium. Hence c(pR, pR) = κ − 0.5(λ1 + λ2)q(pR, pR). Solving for
the equilibrium vector yields
pR =
e1(κ− a(λ1 + λ2)) + a
2e1 + e1(λ1 + λ2)(e2 − e1)− e2
The risk adjustment premium pR can be written (after some algebra) as
pR =
e1(κ− a(λ1 + λ2)) + a
2e1 + e1(λ1 + λ2)(e2 − e1)− e2 ×
(2− e1λ1 − e1λ2) + (e2/e1 − λ1e2 − λ2e2)
(2− e1λ1 − e1λ2) + (e2/e1 − λ1e2 − λ2e2)
=
0.5(NL +NH) + a(λ1 − λ2)2(e1 + e2)
D + (λ1 − λ2)2(e21 − e22)
Define p∗ ≡ 0.5(p∗L + p∗H) = 0.5(NL +NH)/D. Using the fact D > 0,
pR > p∗ ⇔ 0.5(NL +NH) + a(λ1 − λ2)
2(e1 + e2)
D + (λ1 − λ2)2(e21 − e22)
>
0.5(NL +NH)
D
⇔ a > 0.5(NL +NH)(e1 − e2)
D
⇔ a > 0.5(pL + pH)(e1 − e2)
Because of the constraint q∗H > 0⇒ a > e1pH − e2pL,
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a > e1pH − e2pL
> 0.5e1(pL + pH)− e2pL
> 0.5e1(pL + pH)− 0.5e2(pL + pH)
= 0.5(pL + pH)(e1 − e2)
which implies that pR > p∗.
2. Observe that
2q(pR, pR) < qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
⇔ 2(a+ (e2 − e1)pR) < (a− e1p∗L + e2p∗H) + (a+ e2p∗L − e1p∗H)
⇔ 2(e2 − e1)pR < (e2 − e1)p∗L + (e2 − e1)p∗H
⇔ pR > p∗
Because pR > p∗, it follows that 2q(pR, pR) < qL(p∗L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
3. Denote c(pR, pR) as the average claims in the market with risk adjustment. Because
2q(pR, pR) < qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) and qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H), it follows that
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c(pR, pR) = κ− 0.5(λ1 + λ2)q(pR, pR)
> κ− 0.25(λ1 + λ2)[qL(p∗L, p∗H) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
= κ− 0.5[λ1qL(p∗L, p∗H) + λ2qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
+0.25(λ1 − λ2)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
= 0.5(cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)) + 0.25(λ1 − λ2)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
> 0.5(cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H))
4. The change in consumer surplus ∆CS can be written as
∆CS = [CS(pR, pR)− CSL(p∗L, p∗H)] + [CS(pR, pR)− CSH(p∗L, p∗H)]
= −(pR − p∗L)q(pR, pR)− 0.5(pR − p∗L)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− (pR − p∗H)q(pR, pR)− 0.5(pR − p∗H)[qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
= −0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qL(p∗L, p∗H)]− 0.5(pR − p∗H)[q(pR, pR) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
< −0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qL(p∗L, p∗H)] + 0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
< 0
where the first inequality follows because pR > p∗ and the second inequality follows
because 2q(pR, pR) < qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
5. The change in profit ∆pi can be written as
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∆pi = 2pi(pR, pR)− piL(p∗L, p∗H)− piH(p∗L, p∗H)
= 2[pR − c(pR, pR)]q(pR, pR)− [(p∗L − cL(p∗L, p∗H)]qL(p∗L, p∗H)
−[(p∗H − cH(p∗L, p∗H)]qH(p∗L, p∗H)
= (pR − p∗L)q(pR, pR) + (pR − p∗H)q(pR, pR)
− p∗L[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]− p∗H [qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [c(pR, pR)− cL(p∗L, p∗H)]q(pR, pR)− [c(pR, pR)− cH(p∗L, p∗H)]q(pR, pR)
+ cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)[qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)− q(pR, pR)] + cH(p∗L, p∗H)[qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
It can be shown (after very tedious and messy algebra) that the above expression
for the change in profit is strictly negative when substituting the explicit equilibrium
solutions for pR, p∗L, and p
∗
H into the above expression. A more intuitive explanation
for the decline in total profit notes that by Proposition 4.3.1, risk adjustment increases
the proportion of insured consumers covered by the less cost efficient firm (i.e., firm
H) without any change in consumer preferences for the firms’ plans. Hence, total
profit across the two firms declines.
6. The reduction in social welfare follows immediately from the decline in consumer
surplus and firm profit. A direct proof proceeds by writing the change in social
welfare ∆SW as
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∆SW = ∆pi + ∆CS
= [−0.5p∗L − 0.5pR + cL(p∗L, p∗H)][qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [(3/2)p∗H − 0.5pR − cH(p∗L, p∗H)][qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [2c(pR, pR)− cL(p∗L, p∗H)− cH(p∗L, p∗H)]q(pR, pR)
< [−0.5p∗L − 0.5pR + cL(p∗L, p∗H)][qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [(3/2)p∗H − 0.5pR − cH(p∗L, p∗H)][qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
where the inequality follows because 2c(pR, pR) < cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H). Note that
the inequality q(pR, pR) − qL(p∗L, p∗H) > qH(p∗L, p∗H) − q(pR, pR) follows directly from
2q(pR, pR) < qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H). Also observe that
[−0.5p∗L − 0.5pR + cL(p∗L, p∗H)] + [(3/2)p∗H − 0.5pR − cH(p∗L, p∗H)]
< [−(p∗L − cL(p∗L, p∗H)) + (p∗H − cH(p∗L, p∗H))] + 0.5(p∗H − p∗L)
< −[p∗L − cL(p∗L, p∗H)] + [p∗H − cH(p∗L, p∗H)]
< 0
where the final inequality follows because the linear demand function is log-concave
(and hence the margin is increasing in quantity or decreasing in the premium). There-
fore,
∆SW < [−0.5p∗L − 0.5pR + cL(p∗L, p∗H)][qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [(3/2)p∗H − 0.5pR − cH(p∗L, p∗H)][qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)] < 0
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.2
1. First, I find the equilibrium premium vectors (p∗L, p
∗
H) and (p
R
L , p
R
H) for the example
where firms have the linear demand functions (4.10) and the linear average claims
functions (4.12). The Nash premium equilibrium is given by
p∗L =
2(λ2κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)(1− λ1e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ2e2)(λ1κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)
4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2)
p∗H =
2(λ1κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)(1− λ2e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ1e2)(λ2κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)
4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2)
For this equilibrium to be well-defined, I need two constraints on the parameters:
(a) Positive Demand
qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0
⇔ a > κ
[
2e1λ1 − e2λ2 − 2e21λ1λ2 + 2e22λ1λ2 + (e22/e1)λ1
2− 2λ2e1 − 2λ2e2 + e2/e1
]
(A.3)
(b) Positive Marginal Revenue
MRL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0 ⇔ a < κ
[
1− e2
2e1
]
(A.4)
Putting constraints (A.3) and (A.4) together, it follows that the denominator D of
the equilibrium premiums p∗L and p
∗
H is strictly positive. That is,
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2e1λ1 − e2λ2 − 2e21λ1λ2 + 2e22λ1λ2 + (e22/e1)λ1
2− 2λ2e1 − 2λ2e2 + e2/e1 < 1−
e2
2e1
⇔ e1(4λ1 + 4λ2)− 4λ1λ2e21 + 4λ1λ2e22 < e22/e1(2λ1 + 2λ2) + 4− (e2/e1)2
⇔ 4(1− λ1e1 + λ2e1 + λ1λ2e21)− e22
(
1/e21 − 2λ1/e1 − 2λ2/e1 + 4λ1λ2
)
> 0
⇔ 4(1− λ1e1)(1− λ2e1)− e22(1/e1 − 2λ1)(1/e1 − 2λ2) > 0
⇔ D > 0
Let NL and NH be the numerators of p
∗
L and p
∗
H , respectively. Using constraint (A.4)
and the fact that D > 0, it follows that p∗L < p
∗
H because
p∗L < p
∗
H ⇔ NL < NH
⇔ 2(λ2κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)(1− λ1e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ2e2)(λ1κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)
< 2(λ1κ− 2λ1a+ a/e1)(1− λ2e1) + (e2/e1 − 2λ1e2)(λ2κ− 2λ2a+ a/e1)
⇔ λ1(2κ− 2a− (e2/e1)κ) < λ2(2κ− 2a− (e2/e1)κ)
⇔ λ1 > λ2
Moreover, qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0 and MRH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > MRL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0. Be-
cause marginal revenue and marginal claims are equal at equilibrium, MCH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) >
MCL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > 0.
Implementation of risk adjustment eliminates firm L’s cost advantage such that both
firms have the same average claims function. Because both demand and claims are
now symmetric, the firms set the same premium pR ≡ pRL = pRH and insure q(pR, pR)
consumers at equilibrium. Hence c(pR, pR) = −0.5(λ1 + λ2)[q(pR, pR) − κ]. Solving
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for the equilibrium vector yields
pR =
e1(0.5(λ1 + λ2)κ− a(λ1 + λ2)) + a
2e1 + e1(λ1 + λ2)(e2 − e1)− e2
The premium pR can be written (after some algebra) as
pR =
e1(0.5(λ1 + λ2)κ− a(λ1 + λ2)) + a
2e1 + e1(λ1 + λ2)(e2 − e1)− e2 ×
(2− e1λ1 − e1λ2) + (e2/e1 − λ1e2 − λ2e2)
(2− e1λ1 − e1λ2) + (e2/e1 − λ1e2 − λ2e2)
=
0.5(NL +NH) + (a− κ/2)(λ1 − λ2)2(e1 + e2)
D + (λ1 − λ2)2(e21 − e22)
Using the fact D > 0,
pR < p∗ ⇔ 0.5(NL +NH) + (a− κ/2)(λ1 − λ2)
2(e1 + e2)
D + (λ1 − λ2)2(e21 − e22)
<
0.5(NL +NH)
D
⇔ a < κ
2
+
0.5(NL +NH)(e1 − e2)
D
⇔ a < κ
2
+ 0.5(pL + pH)(e1 − e2)
Because the constraint MCL > 0 implies that
MCL(p) > 0 ⇔ qL(p) < κ
2
⇔ a < κ
2
+ e1pL − e2pH
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it follows that a < κ/2 + e1pL− e2pH < κ/2 + 0.5(pL + pH)(e1− e2). Hence, pR < p∗.
2. Observe that
2q(pR, pR) > qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)
⇔ 2(a+ (e2 − e1)pR) > (a− e1p∗L + e2p∗H) + (a+ e2p∗L − e1p∗H)
⇔ 2(e2 − e1)pR > (e2 − e1)p∗L + (e2 − e1)p∗H
⇔ pR < p∗ = 0.5(p∗L + p∗H)
Because pR < p∗, it follows that 2q(pR, pR) > qL(p∗L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
3. Denote c(pR, pR) the average claims in the market with risk adjustment. Because
2q(pR, pR) > qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) and qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) > qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H), it follows that
c(pR, pR)
= −0.5(λ1 + λ2)[q(pR, pR)− κ]
< −0.25(λ1 + λ2)[qL(p∗L, p∗H) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)] + 0.5(λ1 + λ2)κ
= −0.5[λ2qL(p∗L, p∗H) + λ1qH(p∗L, p∗H)] + 0.25(λ2 − λ1)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
+0.5(λ1 + λ2)κ
= 0.5(cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)) + 0.25(λ2 − λ1)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
< 0.5(cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + cH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H))
4. The change in consumer surplus ∆CS can be written as
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∆CS = [CS(pR, pR)− CSL(p∗L, p∗H)] + [CS(pR, pR)− CSH(p∗L, p∗H)]
= −(pR − p∗L)q(pR, pR)− 0.5(pR − p∗L)[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− (pR − p∗H)q(pR, pR)− 0.5(pR − p∗H)[qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
= −0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qL(p∗L, p∗H)]− 0.5(pR − p∗H)[q(pR, pR) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
> −0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qL(p∗L, p∗H)] + 0.5(pR − p∗L)[q(pR, pR) + qH(p∗L, p∗H)]
> 0
where the first inequality follows because pR < p∗ and the second inequality follows
because 2q(pR, pR) > qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H) + qH(p
∗
L, p
∗
H).
5. The change in profit ∆pi can be written as
∆pi = 2pi(pR, pR)− piL(p∗L, p∗H)− piH(p∗L, p∗H)
= 2[pR − c(pR, pR)]q(pR, pR)− [(p∗L − cL(p∗L, p∗H)]qL(p∗L, p∗H)
−[(p∗H − cH(p∗L, p∗H)]qH(p∗L, p∗H)
= (pR − p∗L)q(pR, pR) + (pR − p∗H)q(pR, pR)
− p∗L[qL(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]− p∗H [qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
− [c(pR, pR)− cL(p∗L, p∗H)]q(pR, pR)− [c(pR, pR)− cH(p∗L, p∗H)]q(pR, pR)
+ cL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)[qL(p
∗
L, p
∗
H)− q(pR, pR)] + cH(p∗L, p∗H)[qH(p∗L, p∗H)− q(pR, pR)]
It can be shown (after very tedious and messy algebra) that the above expression
for the change in profit is strictly negative when substituting the explicit equilibrium
solutions for pR, p∗L, and p
∗
H into the above expression. A more intuitive explanation
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for the decline in total profit notes that by Proposition 4.3.2, risk adjustment increases
the proportion of insured consumers covered by the less cost efficient firm (i.e., firm
H) without any change in consumer preferences for the firms’ plans. Hence, total
profit across the two firms declines.
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Appendix B: Mathematical Formulas in Model
In this appendix, I write the variables in the model in terms of four variables: (1) the
household choice probability qij(p); (2) the partial derivative ∂qik/∂pij for all plans j and
k; (3) the firm’s average claims function cf (p); and (4) the vector of claim slopes with
elements ∂cf (p)/∂pj .
Demand Variables
Formulas for plan demand qj(p), firm demand qf (p), market demand q(p), and the risk-
adjusted share are given by
qj(p) =
∑
i∈I
qij(p)
qf (p) =
∑
k∈Jf
qk(p) =
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
qik(p)
q(p) =
∑
l∈J
ql(p) =
∑
i∈I,l∈J
qil(p)
sf (p) =
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf hkqik(p)∑
i∈I,l∈J hlqil(p)
where hj is an expected utilization measure that accounts for the actuarial value of plan j
and associated moral hazard.
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Revenue Variables
Formulas for total firm premium revenue Rf (p) and total premium revenue across all firms
R(p) are given by
Rf (p) =
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
rikpkqik(p)
R(p) =
∑
f∈F
Rf (p) =
∑
i∈I,l∈J
rilplqil(p)
Claims Variables
Formulas for total firm claims Cf (p) and total incurred claims across all firms C(p) are
given by
Cf (p) = cf (p)qf (p) = cf (p)
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
qik(p)
C(p) =
∑
f∈F
Cf (p) =
∑
f∈F
cf (p)
 ∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
qik(p)

Market-wide average claims c(p) can be written as
c(p) =
∑
f∈F qf (p)cf (p)∑
f∈F qf (p)
=
∑
f∈F cf (p)
(∑
i∈I,k∈Jf qik(p)
)
∑
f∈F qf (p)
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Administrative Cost Variables
Variable administrative cost can be written as
Vf = vfqf (p) = vf
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
qik(p)
where vf is the per-member, per-month variable administrative cost.
Demand Partial Derivatives
The partial derivatives of individual demand, plan demand, firm demand, and the risk-
adjusted share with respect to the plan base premium can be written as
∂qik(p)
∂pj
=
∑
l∈J
∂qik(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pj
∂qj(p)
∂pj
=
∑
i∈I
∂qij(p)
∂pj
=
∑
i∈I,l∈J
∂qij(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pj
∂qf (p)
∂pj
=
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf
∂qik(p)
∂pj
=
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf ,l∈J
∂qik(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pil(p)
∂pj
∂sf (p)
∂pj
=
∑
i∈I,l∈J hlqil(p)
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf hk∂qik(p)/∂pj −
∑
i∈I,k∈Jf hkqik(p)
∑
i∈I,l∈J hl∂qil(p)/∂pj(∑
i∈I,l∈J hlqil(p)
)2
Because of the ACA’s complex subsidy design, the change in the household’s subsidized
premium with respect to a change in the base premium (∂pil(p)/∂pj) is somewhat involved.
If j is not the benchmark plan, a dollar increase in the plan’s base premium increases the
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household’s premium for j by the rating factor rij .
1 If j is the benchmark plan, a dollar
increase in plan j’s premium does not affect what consumers pay for plan j because of
offsetting subsidies, but rather decreases what consumers pay for all other plans by rij
dollars. Alternative subsidy designs may change how consumer premiums respond to the
firms’ base premiums. Under a voucher design, an increase in plan j’s premium affects only
what consumers pay for plan j.
Marginal Revenue, Marginal Claims, and Average Marginal Claims
Marginal revenue MRj(p), marginal claims MCj(p), and average marginal claims MCj(p)
can be expressed as
MRj(p) =
∂Rf (p)
∂qj(p)
=
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1∑
i∈I
rijqij(p) + ∑
k∈Jf
rikpk
∂qik(p)
∂pj
 (A.5)
MCj(p) =
∂Cf (p)
∂qj(p)
=
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1 [
cf (p)
∂qf (p)
∂pj
+ qf (p)
∂cf (p)
∂pj
]
(A.6)
MCj(p) =
∂(sf (p)C(p))
∂qj(p)
=
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1 [
C(p)
∂sf (p)
∂pj
+ sf (p)
∂C(p)
∂pj
]
(A.7)
where the partial derivative of total claims incurred by all firms with respect to the base
premium equals
1The change must be sufficiently small for plan j not to become the benchmark plan.
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∂C(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
∂Cf ′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
MCk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
Note that the formula for ∂C(p)/∂pj does not require data on the claims cross-partial
derivatives. That is, it is not necessary to calculate ∂Cf (p)/∂pj if plan j is not sold by
firm f . Elimination of the cross-partial derivatives makes empirical estimation of the model
feasible when only firm-level cost data is available.
Appendix C: Risk Adjustment Under the ACA
In this appendix, I derive the ACA risk adjustment formula and price equilibrium in the
ACA setting. I start with Pope et al. (2014)’s transfer formula as derived in their first
appendix, which allows plans to vary only by their actuarial values (and not by differences
in firm efficiency, geographic costs, allowable rating factors, or moral hazard).2 Pope et al.
(2014) show that the per-member per-month risk adjustment transfer can be calculated
according to formula (A14):
Tj = PLRSj × p− AVj∑
lAVlsl
p
where Tj is the PMPM transfer received by plan j, PLRSj is plan j’s plan liability risk
score, p is the share-weighted average statewide premium, AVl is the actuarial value of plan
l, and sl is plan l’s market share. Pope et al. (2014) define the plan liability risk score as
the ratio of the plan’s average liability to the weighted-average liability across firms, which
in my notation is cj(p)/c(p). The per-member per-month risk adjustment transfer raj(p)
2I start with this formula because I want to capture all differences in expected risk, except for cost sharing
and any associated moral hazard, in the plan’s risk score (i.e., cost sharing and moral hazard are addressed
through the risk-adjusted share sf (p)). In contrast, the plan liability risk score PLRSj as defined in Pope
et al. (2014)’s second appendix does not account for certain differences such as variation in geographic cost.
Instead, Pope et al. (2014) account for these differences by applying factors in the transfer formula.
91
of plan j in my notation equals
raj(p) =
Cj(p)/qj(p)
C(p)/q(p)
R(p)
q(p)
− hjq(p)∑
l∈J hlql(p)
R(p)
q(p)
=
Cj(p)R(p)
qj(p)C(p)
− hj∑
l∈J hlql(p)
R(p)
where I have replaced the actuarial value factors with the total utilization factors hj to
account for moral hazard. The total risk adjustment transfer RAj(p) for plan j is given by
RAj(p) = raj(p)qj(p) =
Cj(p)R(p)
C(p)
− sj(p)R(p)
Summing across all plans k offered by firm f yields
RAf (p) =
Cf (p)R(p)
C(p)
− sf (p)R(p)
To allow for variation in the firm bargaining power and ability to exploit risk adjustment, I
multiply the first term by the efficiency score φf to yield the ACA risk adjustment transfer
formula:
RAf (p) =
φfCf (p)R(p)
C(p)
− sf (p)R(p) (A.8)
Adding the ACA transfer (A.8) to firm f ’s profit function yields
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pif (p) = (1− sf (p))R(p) + φfCf (p)R(p)/C(p)− (1− τf )Cf (p)− Vf − FCf (A.9)
Firm f ’s corresponding first-order conditions are given by
MRj(p) = MRj(p)− φfMC ′j(p) + (1− τf )MCj(p) + vf
∂qf (p)/∂pj
∂qj(p)/∂pj
(A.10)
for j ∈ Jf , whereMRj(p) ≡ ∂[sf (p)R(p)]/∂qj(p) andMC ′j(p) = ∂[Cf (p)R(p)/C(p)]/∂qj(p).
Formulas for MRj(p) and MC
′
j(p) are given by
MRj(p) =
∂(sf (p)R(p))
∂qj(p)
=
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1 [
R(p)
∂sf (p)
∂pj
+ sf (p)
∂R(p)
∂pj
]
MC ′j(p) =
∂
∂qj(p)
(
Cf (p)R(p)
C(p)
)
=
C(p)
[
∂Cf (p)
∂pj
R(p) + Cf (p)
∂R(p)
∂pj
]
− Cf (p)R(p)∂C(p)∂pj
∂qj(p)
∂pj
[C(p)]2
= MCj(p)
R(p)
C(p)
+
Cf (p)
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′ (C(p)MRk′(p)−R(p)MCk′(p))
∂qk′ (p)
∂pj
[C(p)]2
where
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∂R(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
∂Pf ′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
MRk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
∂C(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
∂Cf ′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
=
∑
f ′∈F
∑
k′∈Jf ′
MCk′(p)
∂qk′(p)
∂pj
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Appendix D: Reduced-Form Evidence of Premium Sensitivity
Table 24: Regression Discontinuity Results on Exchange Enrollment Probability by State
California Washington
Premium Changes
400% Subsidy Eligibility Threshold −0.237∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.036)
Age 21 Rating Curve Breakpoint 0.013 −0.041∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Mandate Exemptions
Tax Filing Threshold 0.188∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.031)
Affordability Threshold −0.006 −0.118∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.029)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Table shows the results of four different
regression discontinuity design regressions in which the choice of enrolling in an exchange plan is regressed
on dummy variables for whether (1) the household has income above the upper limit for receiving subsidies
of 400 percent of FPL; (2) the consumer is above the age of 21 (3) the household has income above the tax
filing threshold; and (4) the household has an affordable offer. Local linear regressions are performed on
either side of the thresholds using a triangular kernel and the Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth
calculation.
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Figure 11: Probability of Enrolling in an Exchange Plan by Income
Notes: Figure shows how the probability of enrolling in an exchange plan changes at 400 percent of
poverty, the upper income eligibility limit for receiving premium subsidies. Local linear regressions are
performed on either side of the subsidy threshold using a triangular kernel and the Imbens-Kalyanamaran
optimal bandwidth calculation.
Figure 12: Probability of Enrolling in an Exchange Plan by Age
Notes: Figure shows how the probability of enrolling in an exchange plan changes at age 21. Local linear
regressions are performed on either side of the age threshold using a triangular kernel and the
Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth calculation.
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Figure 13: Probability of Enrolling in an Exchange Plan by Tax Filing Status
Notes: Figure shows how tax filing status affects the probability of enrolling in an exchange plan. Distance
from tax filing threshold is the difference between the household’s income and its tax filing threshold,
measured as a percent of the poverty level. Local linear regressions are performed on either side of the tax
filing threshold using a triangular kernel and the Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth calculation.
Figure 14: Probability of Enrolling in an Exchange Plan by Affordability Exemption Status
Notes: Figure shows how affordability exemption status affects the probability of enrolling in an exchange
plan. Distance from affordability threshold is the difference between the household’s income and its
affordability threshold, measured as a percent of household income. The affordability threshold was 8
percent of household income in 2014 and 8.05 percent of household income in 2015. Local linear regressions
are performed on either side of the affordability threshold using a triangular kernel and the
Imbens-Kalyanamaran optimal bandwidth calculation.
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Appendix E: Estimated Parameters of Demand Model
Table 25: Full Regression Results
California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.293∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.020) (0.067) (0.179) (0.037) (0.147)
Cheapest Plan 0.026∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.008) (0.036)
Cheapest Silver Plan 0.253∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.082) (0.097)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 2.090∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗ 1.329∗∗∗ 1.693∗∗
(0.715) (0.114) (0.647) (0.642) (0.110) (0.715)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗
(0.037) (0.009) (0.040) (0.131) (0.075) (0.114)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.047)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.005 −0.020
(0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.080) (0.073)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.080) (0.088)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.071 0.023∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.073) (0.007)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.029 0.023∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.080) (0.060) (0.018) (0.010) (0.001)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.053)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.074) (0.051)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.142) (0.082) (0.149) (0.044) (0.011) (0.060)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072 0.079∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 25 – Continued from previous page
California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
(0.028) (0.080) (0.029)
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.033)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.115 −0.184∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.080) (0.057)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗
(0.166) (0.077) (0.165)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.084)
Valley −0.003 −0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.086) (0.014)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.113 0.130∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.082) (0.040)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.111) (0.026) (0.092)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗
(0.027) (0.015) (0.017) (0.122) (0.027) (0.097)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(0.026) (0.014) (0.016) (0.124) (0.027) (0.100)
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.010∗ −0.024
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.023)
0-17 0.024 0.021∗∗∗ 0.033∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.020)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.008) (0.033) (0.041) (0.009) (0.040)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.029) (0.025) (0.006) (0.030)
Smoker −0.055 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.034) (0.008) (0.048)
Black −0.143∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.173
(0.081) (0.020) (0.108)
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California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.010) (0.055) (0.038) (0.008) (0.039)
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.004 0.023∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014)
Renewal 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.033 −0.012∗ −0.051
(0.027) (0.006) (0.031) (0.025) (0.007) (0.038)
Intercept
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −2.532∗∗∗ −2.876∗∗∗ 0.500 0.926∗∗∗ 0.212
(0.724) (0.180) (0.815) (0.962) (0.210) (1.317)
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.885∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.115) (0.242)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −1.418∗∗∗ −0.915∗
(0.285) (0.128) (0.468)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.164∗∗∗ −0.981∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −2.135∗∗∗ −1.592∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.058) (0.194) (0.319) (0.127) (0.508)
Male 0.049 0.146∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.275∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.056) (0.043) (0.067)
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.877∗∗∗ −2.717∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.111) (0.119)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.501∗∗∗ −1.458∗∗∗ −2.027∗∗∗ −1.874∗∗∗ −2.024∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.031)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.219∗∗∗ −1.127∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.619∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.051) (0.045) (0.062) (0.048) (0.065)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.922∗∗∗ −1.866∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.058) (0.135)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −2.155∗∗∗ −1.722∗∗∗
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California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
(0.238) (0.102) (0.288)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.950∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.077) (0.075)
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.417∗∗∗ −1.352∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.046) (0.066)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.893∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.040) (0.033) (0.059) (0.036) (0.076)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.036) (0.036) (0.064) (0.036) (0.058)
Renewal 28.334 4.921∗∗∗
(17,334.230)
(0.155)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.137) (0.082) (0.199) (0.053) (0.087) (0.093)
Rating Areas
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.040)
CA/WA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 2.323∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.140) (0.195) (0.039) (0.049) (0.036)
CA/WA3 0.810∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.102) (0.099) (0.085) (0.076) (0.090)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.067) (0.075)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.473∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.121) (0.150)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.833∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.163) (0.246)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.119) (0.127)
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 2.314∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.122) (0.149)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗
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California Washington
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
Base Inertia
Cheapest
Plans
(0.145) (0.126) (0.123)
CA10 −0.260 0.057 −0.331∗∗
(0.165) (0.107) (0.164)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.156∗∗∗ −1.247∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.123) (0.110)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.112) (0.117)
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.329∗∗∗ −1.474∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.127) (0.098)
CA15 −0.036 0.249∗∗∗ −0.038
(0.114) (0.086) (0.097)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.083) (0.078)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.865∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.088) (0.080)
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.090) (0.112)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.088) (0.112)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.063) (0.010) (0.069) (0.076) (0.012) (0.098)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for: (1) base case, which includes an intercept for the individual
mandate, (2) the inertia sensitivity run, and (3) the cheapest plan sensitivity run.
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Table 26: Control Function Regression Results
California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.532∗∗
(0.087) (0.103) (0.179) (0.257)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 2.147∗∗ 1.614∗∗ 1.642∗
(0.715) (0.960) (0.642) (0.927)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.287
(0.037) (0.047) (0.131) (0.187)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.051
(0.022) (0.031)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.006
(0.014) (0.016)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.078) (0.109)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗
(0.092) (0.126)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.090
(0.045) (0.064)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.029 0.028
(0.083) (0.110) (0.018) (0.025)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.083) (0.112)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.209∗
(0.087) (0.127)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.100
(0.142) (0.193) (0.044) (0.062)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.028) (0.035)
Continued on next page
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.152
(0.071) (0.102)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.147∗
(0.042) (0.079)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.379
(0.166) (0.239)
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.083) (0.111)
Valley −0.003 −0.012
(0.012) (0.018)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.039) (0.041)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.111) (0.151)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.324∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.122) (0.166)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.331∗
(0.026) (0.031) (0.124) (0.177)
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.017 −0.017
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024)
0-17 0.024 0.030
(0.017) (0.028)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗
(0.036) (0.052) (0.041) (0.062)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.065∗
Continued on next page
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
(0.030) (0.045) (0.025) (0.035)
Smoker −0.055 −0.056
(0.034) (0.039)
Black −0.143∗ −0.144
(0.081) (0.116)
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.060) (0.087) (0.038) (0.056)
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.019)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.060 −0.033 −0.033
(0.027) (0.038) (0.025) (0.029)
Intercept
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −2.671∗∗ 0.500 0.487
(0.724) (1.116) (0.962) (1.397)
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.131)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −1.057∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.316)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.749∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.231) (0.319) (0.405)
Male 0.049 0.049 −0.275∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.052) (0.056) (0.075)
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.769∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.135)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.456∗∗∗ −2.027∗∗∗ −2.031∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.081)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.677∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.062) (0.102)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.915∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.277)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −1.794∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.176)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.106)
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.365∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.092)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.082) (0.059) (0.057)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.041) (0.064) (0.124)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.176∗
(0.137) (0.212) (0.053) (0.103)
Rating Areas
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.085)
CA/WA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.344∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.201) (0.039) (0.059)
CA/WA3 0.810∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
(0.121) (0.106) (0.085) (0.146)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.075) (0.121)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.349∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.130)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.256∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.256)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.133)
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.154)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.124)
CA10 −0.260 −0.242∗
(0.165) (0.147)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.187∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.118)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.090)
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.478∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.104)
CA15 −0.036 −0.024
(0.114) (0.068)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.063)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.884∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.059)
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California Washington
Base
Control
Function
Base
Control
Function
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.076)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.090)
Residual −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
eta 0.005 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.176
(0.063) (0.100) (0.076) (0.108)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses
(see p.503 of Wooldridge (2010)). Table shows full regression results for: (1) the base case, which includes
an intercept for the individual mandate and (2) the control function approach of Petrin and Train (2010).
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Table 27: California Regression Results - Mandate Regressions
Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.304∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.117) (0.106) (0.138) (0.080)
Penalty ($100) 0.179 0.027
(0.177) (0.148)
Actuarial Value (AV) 2.208∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗ 2.024∗∗ 1.782∗ 2.240∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.792) (0.903) (0.948) (0.684)
HMO −0.116∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.049) (0.035)
Anthem 0.225∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.184∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.086) (0.098) (0.103) (0.075)
Blue Shield CA 0.264∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.101) (0.115) (0.120) (0.088)
Centene/Health Net 0.233∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.103) (0.108) (0.079)
Chinese Community 0.235∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.103) (0.108) (0.079)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.420∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.341∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.156) (0.178) (0.186) (0.135)
LA Care 0.075∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.027)
Molina −0.123∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.098∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.040)
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Sharp 0.245∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091) (0.104) (0.109) (0.079)
Valley −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Western Health 0.117∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.050) (0.052) (0.038)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.045∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
250-400 0.095∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.032) (0.023) (0.018)
400+ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037) (0.019)
Male −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
0-17 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.022 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017)
18-34 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.046) (0.049) (0.034)
35-54 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.096∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.029)
Family 0.186∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.070) (0.074) (0.081) (0.058)
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Year 2015 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mandate −0.060∗∗ −0.054 −0.054∗∗
(0.027) (0.035) (0.021)
Intercept
Base −2.639∗∗∗ −1.776∗∗∗ −2.850∗∗∗ −1.645∗∗ −3.016∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.682) (0.841) (0.806) (0.714)
400+ −1.046∗∗∗ −1.246∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗ −1.094∗∗∗ −0.215
(0.193) (0.177) (0.216) (0.201) (0.323)
Male 0.049 0.067 0.037 0.067 0.037
(0.041) (0.050) (0.049) (0.058) (0.040)
0-17 −2.765∗∗∗ −2.751∗∗∗ −2.815∗∗∗ −2.789∗∗∗ −2.732∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.170) (0.158) (0.178) (0.150)
18-34 −1.461∗∗∗ −1.426∗∗∗ −1.416∗∗∗ −1.381∗∗∗ −1.435∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.054)
35-54 −1.135∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −1.068∗∗∗ −1.086∗∗∗ −1.081∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.065) (0.067) (0.074) (0.063)
Family 1.850∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗ 1.903∗∗∗ 1.842∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.082) (0.114) (0.118) (0.070)
Year 2015 0.417∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.064) (0.062) (0.042)
Mandate 0.663∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.122) (0.155)
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Mandate x gt400 −0.911∗∗∗
(0.212)
Rating Areas
CA2 2.322∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗ 2.352∗∗∗ 2.280∗∗∗ 2.299∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.258) (0.251) (0.280) (0.229)
CA3 0.810∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.133) (0.132) (0.145) (0.120)
CA4/8 2.330∗∗∗ 2.341∗∗∗ 2.364∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗∗ 2.319∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.208) (0.199) (0.225) (0.186)
CA5 2.228∗∗∗ 2.301∗∗∗ 2.465∗∗∗ 2.459∗∗∗ 2.218∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.324) (0.341) (0.369) (0.289)
CA6 2.034∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗ 1.997∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.164) (0.159) (0.178) (0.150)
CA7 2.024∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 2.084∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 2.006∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.197) (0.194) (0.215) (0.175)
CA9 1.227∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.161) (0.156) (0.175) (0.144)
CA10 −0.260 −0.207 −0.224 −0.178 −0.271∗
(0.165) (0.178) (0.186) (0.199) (0.161)
CA11 −1.210∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗ −1.188∗∗∗ −1.165∗∗∗ −1.217∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.137) (0.134) (0.148) (0.122)
CA12 1.509∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ 1.512∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗ 1.506∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.158) (0.152) (0.170) (0.143)
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
CA14 −1.499∗∗∗ −1.530∗∗∗ −1.517∗∗∗ −1.564∗∗∗ −1.584∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.130) (0.127) (0.144) (0.118)
CA15 −0.036 −0.005 −0.023 0.007 −0.050
(0.114) (0.123) (0.125) (0.135) (0.112)
CA16 0.573∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.110) (0.113) (0.123) (0.099)
CA17 −0.893∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗∗ −0.864∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.107) (0.105) (0.116) (0.096)
CA18 0.573∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.145) (0.175) (0.182) (0.132)
CA19 0.595∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.143) (0.149) (0.157) (0.132)
Nesting Parameter 0.184∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.069) (0.078) (0.082) (0.060)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10
percent level. Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses
(see p.503 of Wooldridge (2010)). Table shows full regression results for: (1) the base case, which includes
an intercept for the individual mandate and (2) the individual mandate sensitivity runs for California.
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Table 28: Washington Regression Results - Mandate Regressions
Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
Monthly Premium ($100) −0.530∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.613∗∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.197) (0.139) (0.156) (0.172) (0.110)
Penalty ($100) 0.297∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.038)
Actuarial Value (AV) 1.614∗∗ 1.534∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 1.684∗∗∗ 2.031∗∗∗
(0.642) (0.652) (0.507) (0.526) (0.599) (0.431)
HMO 0.287∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.131) (0.109) (0.111) (0.124) (0.098)
Deductible Ratio −0.051∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016)
Max. OOP Ratio −0.011 −0.010 −0.014 −0.013 −0.011 −0.017
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
BridgeSpan 0.091∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.036)
Centene/Health Net 0.029 0.028 0.035∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
CHPW 0.207∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082) (0.062)
Group Health/Kaiser 0.099∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.031)
Moda 0.151∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.054)
Premera/Lifewise 0.378∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.167) (0.136) (0.139) (0.157) (0.121)
Premium ($100) ×
138-250 0.304∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
(0.111) (0.102) (0.088) (0.079) (0.094) (0.073)
250-400 0.325∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.112) (0.097) (0.088) (0.104) (0.080)
400+ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.125) (0.095) (0.094) (0.111) (0.085)
Male −0.017 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.020 −0.021∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
18-34 −0.124∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.045) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.022)
35-54 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
Smoker −0.055 −0.051 −0.073∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.060∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
Black −0.143∗ −0.133∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.079) (0.061) (0.062) (0.077) (0.072)
Asian −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
White 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Family 0.118∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.022)
Year 2015 0.027∗ 0.026∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Mandate −0.033 −0.046∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.009) (0.025)
Intercept
Base 0.500 0.690 −0.052 0.318 0.035 −0.462
(0.962) (0.960) (0.797) (0.791) (0.902) (0.683)
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
138-250 −0.672∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ −1.196∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.149) (0.116) (0.134) (0.168) (0.095)
250-400 −1.057∗∗∗ −0.977∗∗∗ −1.050∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗ −1.565∗∗∗ −1.286∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.290) (0.218) (0.259) (0.286) (0.180)
400+ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.728∗∗∗ −1.275∗∗∗ −1.210∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗ −1.675∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.317) (0.291) (0.333) (0.383) (0.189)
Male −0.275∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.060) (0.044) (0.048) (0.053) (0.036)
18-34 −2.027∗∗∗ −2.017∗∗∗ −1.939∗∗∗ −1.909∗∗∗ −1.964∗∗∗ −1.818∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.056) (0.046) (0.028)
35-54 −0.676∗∗∗ −0.671∗∗∗ −0.629∗∗∗ −0.609∗∗∗ −0.607∗∗∗ −0.722∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.053) (0.055) (0.063) (0.052)
Smoker −1.916∗∗∗ −1.939∗∗∗ −1.853∗∗∗ −1.899∗∗∗ −1.847∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.115) (0.110) (0.103) (0.113)
Black −1.796∗∗∗ −1.828∗∗∗ −1.792∗∗∗ −1.806∗∗∗ −1.825∗∗∗ −1.810∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.236) (0.192) (0.190) (0.221) (0.192)
Asian −0.677∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.697∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗ −0.721∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.089) (0.074) (0.076) (0.082) (0.057)
White −1.366∗∗∗ −1.378∗∗∗ −1.448∗∗∗ −1.440∗∗∗ −1.386∗∗∗ −1.526∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.057) (0.053) (0.064) (0.056)
Family 0.489∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.043)
Year 2015 0.396∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.051)
Mandate 0.181∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076) (0.109) (0.061)
Mandate x gt400 −1.500∗∗∗
(0.161)
Rating Areas
Continued on next page
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Base -
Mandate
Intercept
No
Mandate
Intercept
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
No
Mandate
Intercept
and
Separate
Penalty
Parameter
Income
Interaction
Exclude
Smoker
Variables
WA1 1.123∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.050) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.033)
WA2 0.869∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033)
WA3 0.840∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.087) (0.074) (0.072) (0.085) (0.070)
WA4 0.277∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.063) (0.062) (0.057) (0.067) (0.054)
Nesting Parameter 0.176∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.062) (0.063) (0.071) (0.055)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Robust standard errors that correct for potential misspecification are shown in parentheses (see p.503 of Wooldridge
(2010)). Table shows full regression results for: (1) base case, which includes an intercept for the individual mandate
and (2) the individual mandate sensitivity runs for Washington state.
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Appendix F: Elasticity and Semi-Elasticity Formulas
This appendix provides equations for the elasticity and semi-elasticity estimates. The own-
premium elasticity of demand εij of household i for plan j equals
εij =
∂ ln qij(p)
∂ ln pj
=
(
rijpj
∂ ln qij(p)
∂pij
)
∂pij
∂pj
= αirijpj
(
1
λ
+
(
λ− 1
λ
)
qij(p)∑
j qij(p)
− qij(p)
)
(A.11)
The own-premium semi-elasticity of demand ςij of household i for plan j equals
ςij =
∂ ln qij(p)
∂pj
× (100/12)
= αi
(
1
λ
+
(
λ− 1
λ
)
qij(p)∑
j qij(p)
− qij(p)
)
× (100/12) (A.12)
The exchange coverage elasticity of demand %i of household i equals
%i =
∑
j
qij(p)
∂ ln
(∑
j qij(p)
)
∂ ln pj

=
∑
j
[
αirijpjqij(p)
(
1− qij(p)∑
j qij(p)
)]
(A.13)
The exchange coverage semi-elasticity of demand ϑi of household i equals
118
ϑi =
∑
j
qij(p)
∂ ln
(∑
j qij(p)
)
∂pj

=
∑
j
[
αiqij(p)
(
1− qij(p)∑
j qij(p)
)]
× (100/12) (A.14)
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